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Da vid Král1
The Fu tu re EU Mu l tian nu al
Fi nan cial Per spe c ti ve
In sti tu tio nal and Po li cy Con text
The ne go ti a tion of the next EU multiannual bud get will take place un der
a very dif fer ent pol icy con text than the pre vi ous agree ments. First of all, the
 future fi nan cial per spec tive will be agreed un der the new Lis bon Treaty rules
which an chor multiannual bud get ing in the EU pri mary leg is la tion and thus
make it an oblig a tory way of de cid ing about how the EU will spend its money.
Un like pre vi ous inter-in sti tu tional bud get agree ments that were adopted for
a 7-year pe riod, Ar ti cle 312 of the Treaty on Func tion ing of the Eu ro pean  Union
(TFEU) does n’t stip u late any pe riod as oblig a tory, but sets the min i mum of
5-years. The main ar gu ment in fa vour of hav ing a shorter bud get ary per spec -
tive is the in sti tu tional one: par tic u larly the Eu ro pean Par lia ment ar gues that
for the sake of dem o cratic ac count abil ity, the multiannual frame work should
be in line with the terms of the Eu ro pean Par lia ment and Eu ro pean Com mis -
sion. A shorter multiannual frame work would also prob a bly en sure more flex i -
bil ity than a lon ger one in terms of pos si ble re-prioritisation. The main
coun ter-ar gu ment is that a 5-year pe riod is too short to launch and im ple ment
new programmes or to make any pro found changes in ex ist ing ones if nec es -
sary. Thus a so lu tion might be a com bi na tion of the two ap proaches, e.g., a lon ger
multiannual frame work (e.g., 10 years) with a more pro found mid-term re view 
af ter 5 years al low ing for re flec tion on chang ing pri or i ties while keep ing the
main programmes in place. 
The forth com ing multiannual per spec tive will be adopted as Coun cil Reg u -
la tion by spe cial leg is la tive pro ce dure. How ever, as sent of the Eu ro pean
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 Parliament must be granted which es sen tially gives it a veto over the pos si -
ble deal struck among mem ber states. One of the dif fi cul ties that was not
elim i nated by the Lis bon Treaty is the una nim ity re quire ment in the Coun -
cil.  Although the Eu ro pean Coun cil can de cide that the de ci sion will be
taken by the Coun cil by qual i fied ma jor ity (a spe cial passerelle clause), due 
to the sen si tiv ity of the bud get ary de bates it can not be re al is ti cally ex pected 
to hap pen.
The eco nomic cri sis that hit Eu rope in the past few years as well as the sov -
er eign debt prob lems that some of the EU mem bers are cur rently fac ing, have
dra mat i cally changed the con text of the up com ing bud get de bate. The eco -
nomic down turn, stim u lus pack ages com ing from na tional bud gets and ten -
sions these have cre ated on pub lic fi nances pre-de ter mine a very cau tious
ap proach of many EU gov ern ments to wards the size of the bud get (i.e., very
un likely to con sider any raise), as well as to the pos si ble ex ten sion of hte rev e nue
side of it. More over, the fact that the EU bud get is used as col lat eral to wards
the loans pro vided by the Eu ro pean Sta bil ity Mech a nism also rep re sents a new 
fac tor in the up com ing ne go ti a tions. Thus rather than on the size of the bud get,
one can ex pect that the de bate will be more fo cused on its flex i bil ity (which
would en able it to re act more swiftly to the chang ing en vi ron ment or pri or i -
ties), and on its abil ity to de liver as well as on in ter nal co he sion. 
The Re ve nue Side of the Bu d get:  
Time to Con si der New Own Re so u r ces?
Al though the core of the de bate usu ally fo cuses on how EU money is
spent, there is in creas ing pres sure from var i ous ac tors, in clud ing the Eu ro -
pean Par lia ment and civil so ci ety (which is ob vi ous from con sul ta tions re lat -
ing to the mid-term bud get re view) to re visit the is sue of the Un ion’s own
re sources. The cur rent sys tem en shrined in the found ing Trea ties stip u lates
that the EU bud get must be fi nanced solely by the Un ion’s own re sources
(Ar ti cle 311 TFEU) while leav ing it up to the Coun cil to de ter mine the de tails 
through Coun cil reg u la tion adopted by spe cial leg is la tive pro ce dure (in volv -
ing the Eu ro pean Par lia ment only in con sul ta tion) and duly ap proved by the
na tional par lia ments un der re spec tive con sti tu tional pro vi sions. Cur rently,
the EU’s own re sources con sist of tra di tional own re sources such as tar iffs
and ag ri cul tural lev ies, a por tion of VAT col lected by mem ber states and the
sup ple men tary source based on GNI ra tio. The im por tance of the lat ter
source has grown im mensely over the past years and now it rep re sents over
3/4of EU rev e nues. Al though this sys tem (put in place par tic u larly to en sure
the  balance of the EU bud get re quired by found ing trea ties) is in prin ci ple
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 considered as just by a ma jor ity of mem ber states, it has been de formed over
the years by var i ous cor rec tions and the  principle of juste re tour which take
into ac count not only what the mem ber states put into the bud get but also
what each one gets out of it. The crit i cism of the Eu ro pean Par lia ment also
stems from the fact that the GNI-based ap proach puts the mem ber states
rather than cit i zens in the texpayers’ po si tion and thus dis en gages the EU
bud get set ting from nor mal dem o cratic bud get ing pro cess. An other prob lem
seen by many is that ex cept for the tar iffs there is no clear link be tween the
EU rev e nues and EU pol i cies. 
The mid-term bud get ary re view for the cur rent pro gram ming pe riod,
pub lished by the Eu ro pean Com mis sion (COM(2010)700), iden ti fies three
main chal lenges for the up com ing EU fi nan cial per spec tive: sim pli fi ca tion
of mem ber states’ con tri bu tions, pro gres sive in tro duc tion of sev eral new
re sources based on dif fer ent EU pol icy ar eas and grad ual elim i na tion of
cur rently ap pli ca ble cor rec tion mech a nisms for var i ous EU mem ber states.
As for the first pro posal, it prac ti cally aims at grad ual re moval of the
VAT-based source, or its merger with the GNI-based source as the cal cu la -
tion of con tri bu tions from VAT adds to the opac ity of the cur rent sys tem
and there is no clear link be tween the tax pay ers and the EU bud get. On the
con trary, there is a whole range of new re sources that can be in tro duced
based on par tic u lar pol icy ar eas. This would shift the dis course on the EU
bud get from net ac count ing bal ance per cep tion to pub lic goods per cep tion,
and would more over take the bur den off the na tional bud gets (which might
be a wel come move con sid er ing the cur rent pub lic  finance prob lems of
many EU mem ber states), as the in tro duc tion of new  resources would bring
about di min ish ment of the ex ist ing GNI source. Some of the pro pos als for
these “EU taxes” in clude taxes on the fi nan cial sec tor, of the emis sion trad -
ing scheme, of EU air traf fic, an EU en ergy tax or EU cor po rate in come tax.
Fi nally, the (grad ual)  removal and phas ing out of the ex ist ing cor rec tions
would in crease the trans par ency and fair ness of the EU bud get ing and also
help steer the  debate away from the net bal ance dis course.
EU Ex pen di tu res – 
Time for a Poli cy -O rien ted Bu d get? 
The ne go ti a tions of EU ex pen di tures is likely to in volve more con tro versy
than the de bate on the rev e nue side. De spite the fact that the Com mis sion’s
 proposal which will in au gu rate the inter-in sti tu tional bar gain ing will be pre -
sented only in June 2011, some el e ments can al ready be de tected in the
mid-term bud get re view re ferred to above. The Com mis sion will clearly like
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to see a pol icy-ori ented bud get which would be cen tred around the Eu rope
2020 strat egy, rep re sent ing the main stra te gic doc u ment for the EU for the next 
de cade. The strat egy which fo cuses on reinvigorating the Eu ro pean econ omy
con sists of three el e ments of growth: smart growth, sus tain able growth and
 inclusive growth. The other cat e go ries of the EU bud get will in clude the is sues
and pol icy ar eas not linked di rectly to Eu rope 2020 strat egy: i.e., cit i zen ship,
pre-ac ces sion in stru ments, EU for eign pol icy (re ferred to as Global Eu rope)
and ad min is tra tive ex pen di ture. It is ob vi ous that most of the dis cus sion of the
ex pen di ture side of the bud get will be thus cen tred around the ques tion of how
to dis trib ute ex pen di ture among the three el e ments of growth hinted at therein,
par tic u larly how to (re)al lo cate the costs of the cur rently most costly pol i cies
in terms of over all ex pen di ture (ag ri cul ture and co he sion pol icy), and also to
what ex tent to in cor po rate new chal lenges that the EU is fac ing, such as en ergy 
and cli mate change. 
The ba sic el e ments of the smart growth cat e gory will con sist mainly of two
cat e go ries: in no va tion, re search and ed u ca tion, and in fra struc ture. Many
stake holders have ar gued for the need to em pha size es pe cially the first el e ment 
in the fu ture EU bud get as it is seen as the main en gine of growth and hav ing
the po ten tial of cre at ing ex tra jobs. The logic also is that the EU bud get will
take part of the re spon si bil ity for keep ing a high level of R&D spend ing dur ing 
times when na tional bud gets are un der se ri ous pres sure and fu ture-ori ented,
non-man da tory ex pen di tures are the first ones to be likely cut. The EU can
profit from new in sti tu tions such as the Eu ro pean In sti tute of Tech nol ogy or
Eu ro pean Re search Coun cil, but the main prob lem is not the lack of spend ing
on R&D across the EU, but rather du plic ity and over lap ping of spend ing, so
the key chal lenge will be to fos ter the evo lu tion of the Eu ro pean Re search Area 
which would en sure better syn ergy among var i ous pro jects and ini tia tives
across the EU. An other ma jor chal lenge will be strik ing the right bal ance be -
tween the two sub cat e go ries: re search and in no va tion on one hand, and in vest -
ments in in fra struc ture on the other. 
Sus tain able growth will have to rec on cile de vel op ments in two key ar eas:
Com mon Ag ri cul tural Pol icy (CAP) and en ergy & cli mate change  policies.
While a large num ber of mem ber states will prob a bly be op posed to a rad i cal
de crease in over all ag ri cul tural spend ing, many of them see a strong role of
the EU in terms of in vest ments in sus tain able en ergy in fra struc ture as a ma jor 
chal lenge which should be re flected in the next bud get. One pos si bil ity is
that the en ergy and cli mate can be in cluded in the re-prioritisation in other
bud get ary cat e go ries such as re search, co he sion and ag ri cul ture. As far as the 
CAP is con cerned, the ne go ti a tions will have to tackle the is sue of how to
match ag ri cul tural spend ing with other cross-cut ting pri or i ties such as com -
pet i tive ness, en vi ron men tal pro tec tion, etc. The de tails of fu ture fi nanc ing of 
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CAP will prob a bly have to be  addressed in a sep a rate set of ne go ti a tions with
the ma jor is sue be ing the re-eval u a tion of the ref er ence val ues de ter min ing
the level of di rect sup port which are now clearly ir rel e vant as they are more
than a de cade old. An other ma jor el e ment in ne go ti a tions will be the dis crep -
an cies in di rect pay ments be tween the farm ers in dif fer ent EU mem ber states. 
It is dif fi cult to pre dict at the mo ment how rad i cal the re form of the CAP
will be in the con text of the up com ing bud get ne go ti a tions. One can en vis age
a less dras tic re form which will take the form of re-prioritisation in the cur -
rent sys tem of CAP fund ing (such as more em pha sis on sustainability and
 rural de vel op ment mea sures) as well as more rad i cal mea sures that would
move the ex ist ing schemes to wards a more mar ket-ori ented ap proach and
the fur ther phas ing-out of di rect  payments. 
As for the last el e ment of the Eu rope 2020 strat egy – in clu sive growth – one 
can also ex pect very tough ne go ti a tions es pe cially in re spect to the fu ture of
co he sion pol icy. The main prob lem is po lit i cal – linked to the broad de vel op -
ments in the EU which de crease the richer mem ber states ap pe tite for sol i dar ity 
with poorer mem bers (or re gions) and make it in creas ingly dif fi cult to sell this
to the do mes tic elec tor ates. At the same time, the coun tries that cur rently ben e -
fit from co he sion pol i cies would prob a bly not like to see this in stru ment sig nif -
i cantly di min ished. The ma jor chal lenge in this re spect does n’t lie in the
ne go ti a tions of the over all amounts to be al lo cated to co he sion pol icy, but also
in sim pli fi ca tion in pro gram ming and eas ier ac cess to struc tural funds.
 However, by align ing the co he sion pol icy more closely with Eu rope 2020
strat egy the mem ber states should also ac cept the idea that their na tional pro -
gram ming doc u ments should be linked to the over all Un ion ob jec tives. This
might be  potentially con tro ver sial as some mem ber states still view the co he -
sion pol icy as a way of get ting EU funds for pro jects that are im por tant in their
own judge ment. 
From the other non-pri or ity ob jec tives one has to as sume also the grow -
ing need for EU ac tion in two other ar eas: cit i zen ship (which in cludes free -
dom, se cu rity and jus tice) and Global Eu rope.  While the first area has to face 
the pres sure that more is sues such as mi gra tion should be tack led at the Eu ro -
pean level, the is sue of will ing ness to put more funds into a com mon Eu ro -
pean  approach to sen si tive is sues again faces a some what re luc tant attitude of 
some of the mem ber states. Sim i larly, de spite the pro claimed en gage ment of
Eu rope glob ally, the EU is of ten not able to put its money where its mouth
is and re lies more on the mem ber states tak ing var i ous ini tia tives (e.g., in
 response to newly emerg ing cri ses), in clud ing their bear ing the fi nan cial
costs for such ac tions.
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Con c lu sion – Not ma t ching am bi tion with re a li ty?
The up com ing bud get ary ne go ti a tions are go ing to be trapped in a mis -
match be tween ex ces sive ex pec ta tions on the one hand (par tic u larly on the part 
of the com mu ni tarian in sti tu tions) and the harsh re al ity stem ming from the
cur rent mood in the na tional cap i tals and in creased dis trust among mem ber
states. On one hand, the EU is ex pected (not least by many mem ber states) to
de liver in new pol i cies, such as en ergy & cli mate change, ex ter nal ac tion, cit i -
zen ship or R&D. This would in di cate that the EU bud get should in deed have
ad e quate fund ing for these new pol i cies which is likely to be de fended by the
Com mis sion and the Eu ro pean Par lia ment. On the other hand, the mem ber
states in the wake of the debt cri sis and var i ous mea sures agreed out side of the
EU bud get (such as the Eu ro pean Sta bil ity Mech a nism) will be op posed to any
over all  increase of the bud get. While most of the mem ber states ac knowl edge
the need for re ad just ing the EU fi nances to be fit ter for the chal lenges of the
21st cen tury, hardly any of them are will ing to give up on pol i cies or mech a -
nisms that bring ben e fits to their coun tries and cit i zens. The com pro mise will
thus have to rec on cile these two ap par ently con tra dic tory ap proaches. While
the over all thresh old of the bud get ary spend ing is not likely to rise dra mat i -
cally, the ne go ti a tions will cer tainly lead to open ing of the de bate on both the
rev e nue and the ex pen di ture side. The pos si bil ity of con sid er ing new own
 resources for the EU bud get might be tricky at the mo ment, but in the long-run
may ac tu ally help the na tional cap i tals by re duc ing pres sure on their own bud -
gets and change the per cep tion that the bud get ary ne go ti a tions are a zero-sum
game. On the ex pen di ture side, un less ma jor re shuf fles among the bud get ary
cat e go ries are to be agreed (which is un likely), the most likely way for ward
will be that the new pri or i ties will be stream lined into ex ist ing programmes.
Part of the de bate will prob a bly fo cus more on the flex i bil ity of the bud get in
terms of its re ad just ments to new pri or i ties and chal lenges. Whether and how
this be im ple mented, how ever, will not be de cided in the “grand bar gain”
which will be launched un der the Pol ish EU pres i dency.  
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Grzegorz Gromadzki1
The En ergy Rid dle
of the Pol ish Pres i dency
The Pol ish Gov ern ment should re think its en ergy pri or ity for the Pres i -
dency of the EU Coun cil, since it would clearly be a mis take to only con cern
 itself with the EU’s ex ter nal en ergy pol icy. The sec ond half of this year, when
Po land takes on the Pres i dency, will be a time when sev eral other im por tant
en ergy is sues will also have to be dealt with. Fur ther more, pur su ance of the
EU’s ex ter nal en ergy pol icy must be within the con text of the Un ion’s in ter nal
en ergy mar ket. For this rea son, the scope of this en ergy pri or ity needs to be
broad ened.
The fi nal pri or i ties for the Pol ish Pres i dency will be an nounced just prior to 
Po land tak ing over this role. The pro pos als pre sented by the Gov ern ment are
there fore still ten ta tive and sub ject to change. This needs to be re mem bered
when for mu lat ing con clu sions.
En ergy is among the pri or i ties Po land wants to pur sue dur ing the Pres i dency, 
not as a whole but only as re gards “the strength en ing of the EU’s ex ter nal en ergy 
pol icy” (“Po land be lieves that due to the work on a new en ergy strat egy for the
next de cade, it will be nec es sary to ex am ine the con di tion of the ex ter nal EU
 energy pol icy and de velop so lu tions to strengthen it.”2). Fur ther more, this is to
be in cluded in a broader pri or ity re ferred to as “a se cure Eu rope”.3
1  Grze gorz Gro ma dz ki is an in de pen dent ex pert in in ter na tio nal af fa irs, EU Ea stern Po li cy
and ene r gy po li cy.
2  See “The Si x - Month Pro gram me of the Po lish Pre si den cy of the EU Co un cil in the  Second
Half of 2011”, ad op ted by the Co un cil of Mi ni sters on 15 March: http://www.pre zy den cjaue.
gov.pl/en/areas -of- prepa ra tions/pro gram
3  The Po lish Go ve r n ment plans to pu r sue three prio ri ties du ring the Pre si den cy: “a se cu re
Eu ro pe”, “Eu ro pe an in te gra tion as a so u r ce of growth”, and “the be ne fits of open ness for Eu ro pe”;
see the do cu ment re fer red to abo ve.
Ini tially “the strength en ing of the EU’s ex ter nal en ergy pol icy” was to be
con sol i dated into a sin gle pri or ity (“a se cure Eu rope”) with only one other
 issue (“hard se cu rity”), as re flected in a state ment made re cently by Miko³aj
Dowgielewicz, Dep uty Min is ter for For eign Af fairs re spon si ble for the prep a -
ra tions for the Pres i dency in terms of pri or i ties (“Third, the se cu rity of the
 Union, that is to say its com mon se cu rity and de fence pol icy and ex ter nal
 energy pol icy”4). How ever, for now “a se cure Eu rope” cov ers also some other
is sues, such as con fi dence of fi nan cial mar kets, pro tec tion of the EU’s ex ter nal 
bor ders, and food se cu rity.5
Dis course Shapes the Pri or ity
It could be claimed that such an en ergy pri or ity is the out come of the dis course
con cern ing en ergy is sues in Po land which re volves pri mar ily around the se cu rity
of raw ma te rial sup plies, in par tic u lar nat u ral gas. This con cern gov erns not only
the dis course among the var i ous de ci sion-mak ers but also the gen eral pub lic.
There is much ap pre hen sion con cern ing Gazprom, Rus sia as a whole, and an other
gas cri sis like that in 2009, which was due to a con flict be tween Rus sia and
Ukraine. Such con cern is not un com mon in sev eral other Mem ber States, in par -
tic u lar those that like Po land are heavily de pend ent on gas sup plies from Rus sia.
Apart from the se cu rity of sup ply, in Po land dis course on en ergy is sues
cen tres around the pro found dread of changes in the en ergy land scape, and
more broadly, in the econ omy as a whole; changes that would be ne ces si tated
by a move away from coal as the main en ergy source. This prob lem is par tic u -
larly acute for Po land be cause un like any other Mem ber State, the coun try is
heavily re li ant on coal (both hard coal and lig nite). Yet there are no plans to
sub stan tially re duce this de pend ence on coal in the next sev eral de cades:
“State en ergy pol icy as sumes us ing coal as the main fuel for the power in dus -
try in or der to en sure an ad e quate level of en ergy se cu rity of the coun try.”6
This also leads to the aver sion in Po land to wards the EU’s cli mate pol icy. Such 
an at ti tude is rad i cally dif fer ent from that in the main cur rent of thought con -
cern ing en ergy is sues in the ma jor ity of EU Mem ber States and EU in sti tu -
tions. Be cause it finds it in con ve nient it is highly unlikely that the Pol ish
Gov ern ment has the de sire to fully em brace the EU en ergy and cli mate pol icy
or pro mote the same dur ing  Poland’s Pres i dency.
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4  See Mi ni ster Do wgie le wicz sta te ment of 14 March: http://euro pa r la ment.pap.pl/pa lio/
html.run?_In stan ce=cms_ep.pap.pl&_Pa ge ID=1&_me nu Id=17&_nrDep=27158&_Che c kSum
=522582051
5  See the do cu ment re fer red to in fo o t no te 1 abo ve.
6  See the “Ene r gy Po li cy of Po land un til 2030”: http://www.mg.gov.pl/fi les/up lo ad/8134/
Po li ty ka%20e ner gety cz na%20ost_en.pdf
Po land’s Am big u ous Stance
It is dif fi cult to re gard the Pol ish Gov ern ment’s at ti tude to wards the EU
 energy and cli mate pol icy as con sis tent or well though out. There are at least
three rea sons for this.
First, there is a sys temic prob lem
En ergy and cli mate is sues are the prov ince of sev eral de ci sion-mak ing cen -
tres within the Pol ish Gov ern ment. With re gard to en ergy, the most im por tant
role is played by the Min is try of the Econ omy. As for cli mate pol icy, the high est
au thor ity is the Min is try of the En vi ron ment. How ever, both these ar eas also
fall within the com pe tence of the Min is try of For eign Af fairs. Fur ther more,
un til re cently there was also an En ergy Pleni po ten tiary, a post within the
Chan cel lery of the Prime Min is ter. It is ob vi ous that the at ten dant con fu sion
has yet to be dis pelled, even though in 2009 the Gov ern ment adopted and pub -
lished the “En ergy Strat egy of Po land un til 2030”.
Such frag men ta tion of au thor ity at a do mes tic level leads to need less in con -
sis ten cies. From time to time it even gives rise to ri valry be tween the var i ous
de ci sion-mak ing fac tions. Yet there still ex ists no struc ture within the Gov ern -
ment where dis pa rate po si tions could be con sol i dated into co her ent so lu tions
to en ergy and cli mate is sues.
Sec ond, Po land has no clear-cut stance on en ergy re la tions
with third coun tries
The Pol ish Gov ern ment seems to be lack ing a clear-cut stance on en ergy
 relations with third coun tries. On the one hand, the Pol ish Gov ern ment ad vo -
cates the broad est pos si ble de vel op ment of a com mon EU en ergy pol icy
vis--vis third coun tries (communitisation), in the be lief that its po si tion in
 negotiations with them will thus be made sig nif i cantly stron ger, with Po land
be ing re garded as a con stit u ent part of the Un ion, and not a lone player. On the
other hand, it would seem that when ever it sees fit, the Pol ish Gov ern ment dis -
re gards the rules adopted by the Un ion as a whole (and thus also by Po land
as a Mem ber State!). The best ex am ple of this were the 2010 ne go ti a tions
on the gas agree ment with Rus sia. The first draft of the agree ment con tained
terms and con di tions that were clearly con trary to the sec ond and third en ergy
pack ages (third-party ac cess, unbundling). At in for mal dis cus sions at that time 
some Pol ish de ci sion-mak ers were even tempted to claim that since the
third pack age had not yet come into force it need not be in cluded in the Pol ish -
-Rus sian agree ment. This gave rise to con flict within the Pol ish Gov ern ment,
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and in par tic u lar be tween the Min is try of the Econ omy and the Min is try of
For eign Af fairs, the lat ter be ing ve he mently op posed to such terms and con di -
tions. Of course, it also gave rise to se ri ous con flict be tween the Pol ish
 Government and the Eu ro pean Com mis sion, the lat ter be ing the guard ian
 ensuring com pli ance with the EU reg u la tions that guar an tee in di vid ual Mem -
ber States greater se cu rity with re gard to gas sup plies from third coun tries.
Po land also seems to be lack ing the req ui site ea ger ness to im ple ment EU
en ergy leg is la tion. The third en ergy pack age is still wait ing to be trans posed.
Po land is also not avail ing it self of the op por tu ni ties af forded by the es tab lish -
ment of the En ergy Com mu nity, the or gani sa tion cre ated with a view of in te -
grat ing the West ern Bal kan States with the com mon en ergy mar ket (elec tric ity
and nat u ral gas) in the EU. The En ergy Com mu nity was re cently ex panded by
the ac ces sion of two East ern Part ner ship Coun tries: Moldova and Ukraine.
Un for tu nately, Po land is still not a par tic i pant of this or gani sa tion even though
it is as much en ti tled to join as any other EU Mem ber State. Ac ces sion would
al low Po land to par tic i pate fully in all En ergy Com mu nity ac tiv i ties. The
 Energy Com mu nity al ready com prises 14 EU Mem ber States, in clud ing all
the other Visegrad Group coun tries, Ger many, France, Great Brit ain, It aly,
Aus tria, Ro ma nia and Bul garia. There is no ra tio nal rea son why Po land is still
not a par tic i pant.
Third, there is no clear-cut stance on the EU’s cli mate pol icy
The Pol ish Gov ern ment seems re luc tant to adopt a clear-cut stance on the
EU’s cli mate pol icy. On the one hand, the Pol ish Gov ern ment is not keen on
the am bi tious goals in the en ergy and cli mate pack age, in par tic u lar those
 relating to a rad i cal re duc tion of CO2 emis sions. It is op posed to such goals
be ing achieved in Po land due to the very high cost to the na tional econ omy.
On the other hand, Po land wishes to be seen in the EU as an “emerg ing
power” – a coun try to be reck oned with. Po land can not there fore af ford to
keep on  totally ne gat ing the EU’s cli mate pol icy, es pe cially since its im ple -
men ta tion has be come one of the EU’s top pri or i ties. Usu ally, Po land adopts
a de fen sive po si tion to wards the EU’s cli mate pol icy. A good ex am ple of this 
can be found in the “En ergy Pol icy of Po land un til 2030”, where the main en -
ergy pol icy tools in clude “Ac tiv ity within the struc tures of the Eu ro pean
 Union, par tic u larly those lead ing to such EU en ergy pol icy and Com mu nity
re quire ments in re spect of en vi ron men tal pro tec tion that would take into
 account the na ture of the Pol ish power sec tor and re sult in Po land’s en hanced 
en ergy se cu rity.”7
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En ergy Pri or ity for the Pres i dency – a Crit i cal View
There are at least four rea sons why the en ergy pri or ity for the Pol ish Pres i -
dency ought to be broad ened.
Firstly, there are other en ergy is sues that are at least as im por tant as “the
strength en ing of the EU’s ex ter nal en ergy pol icy”. One could, for ex am ple,
men tion is sues re lat ing to en ergy ef fi ciency or those cov ered by the EU en ergy 
and cli mate pol icy, as seen within the con text of the forth com ing Durban
(COP-17) con fer ence which will take place dur ing the Pol ish Pres i dency. Lim -
it ing the en ergy pri or ity only to “the strength en ing of the EU’s ex ter nal  energy
pol icy” would un for tu nately lead to re in force ment of the ste reo type Po land al -
ready tends to suf fer from, namely that of a county whose per spec tive on
 energy is sues tends to be very nar row in deed. Po land ap pears to view such
 issues only in terms of its own en ergy se cu rity and in par tic u lar, the se cu rity of
gas sup plies from Rus sia. Yet at the same time Po land seems to be re luc tant to
 embrace is sues re lat ing to cli mate change or the low-car bon econ omy.
Sec ondly, com bin ing the com mon se cu rity and de fence pol icy with the
 energy pol icy is a mis take, as this (at least to some de gree) leads to prob lems
con cern ing the se cu rity of en ergy raw ma te rial sup plies be ing iden ti fied with
so-called “hard se cu rity” prob lems. This link ing of the two pol i cies re sults in
the nee dless “mili ta ri sa tion” of en ergy is sues. Such is sues, and in par tic u lar
these re lat ing to the se cu rity of en ergy raw ma te rial sup plies for Eu rope, are
not  governed by eco nomic con sid er ations alone, tend ing to be heavily po liti -
cised, es pe cially when it co mes to re la tions with Rus sia. But ev ery thing that
pos si bly can should be done to re duce these to the level of the econ omy.
Thirdly, the in ter nal and ex ter nal as pects of the EU’s en ergy pol icy can not
be viewed sep a rately. Ef fec tive ex ter nal EU en ergy pol icy pre sup poses the
achieve ment of a com mon en ergy mar ket in the EU with all the at ten dant
 legislation. This truth ought to be re flected in the en ergy pri or ity as fi nally
adopted by Po land for the Pres i dency.
Fourthly, there are pres ently no di rect ref er ences to the EU’s cli mate
 policy, which in both the in ter nal and ex ter nal as pects is in sep a ra ble from its
en ergy pol icy. It is no ac ci dent that one of the key EU doc u ments con cern ing
the EU’s en ergy pol icy is the cli mate and en ergy pack age adopted in 2008.
An other Im por tant Year Ahead
Over the last few years, each year has been as im por tant for the EU’s
 energy pol icy as the next, this area be ing char ac ter ised by con stant and rapid
changes and at ten dant prob lems. This shows how im por tant and dif fi cult
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 theses is sues are for the var i ous Mem ber States, var i ous in ter est groups and
ma jor in dus try play ers.  This year alone, on 4 Feb ru ary, the Eu ro pean Coun -
cil for the first time in his tory held an en ergy sum mit.  Though this did not
bring any spec tac u lar re sults, it showed how im por tant en ergy is sues are for 
the EU.  In March, the Eu ro pean Com mis sion pre sented the Eu ro pean
 Energy  Efficiency Plan.  This doc u ment is a kind of roadmap for the EU on
en ergy  efficiency un til 2020.  Next, by June, the Eu ro pean Com mis sion is
to pres ent a draft reg u la tion on de vis ing an in fra struc ture in stru ment that is
to be of par a mount im por tance for the fur ther de vel op ment of en ergy
(power and gas)  infrastructure in the EU.  The same month will see a de ci -
sion be ing taken on the fu ture of the South ern Gas Cor ri dor.  In Sep tem ber,
the Eu ro pean Com mis sion is to pres ent a com pre hen sive set of pro pos als on 
the ex ter nal di men sion of the EU en ergy pol icy, and in No vem ber, a fun da -
men tal En ergy Roadmap for 2050, lay ing down the en ergy sec tor mea sures
to be taken by the EU up to that date.  And last but not least, by the be gin -
ning of De cem ber, a con fer ence on cli mate (COP17) is to be held in
Durban, South Af rica. This con fer ence will be ab so lutely cen tral to reach -
ing a world wide agree ment on the re duc tion of CO2 emis sions that will
 replace the Kyoto Pro to col.
Chal lenges to be Faced
Even this brief list of events shows how im por tant these com ing months,
in clud ing those dur ing the Pol ish Pres i dency, will be for the EU’s en ergy
 policy as a whole. For this rea son, the Pol ish Gov ern ment ought to re think its
at ti tude to wards en ergy is sues, es pe cially within the con text of the forth com -
ing Pres i dency. The Gov ern ment should there fore: 
Mod ify its En ergy Pri or ity for the Pres i dency
The ex ter nal EU en ergy pol icy should not be seen as the “be-all and
end-all” for the Pol ish Pres i dency. Dur ing its Pres i dency Po land will be forced
to deal with en ergy is sues fall ing out side the scope of the ex ter nal EU en ergy
pol icy. It should there fore re de fine its en ergy pri or ity for the Pres i dency and
thus prove it is not ob sessed with solely the ex ter nal di men sion of the EU
 energy pol icy and the need to guar an tee the se cu rity of en ergy raw  material
sup plies.
It would be better still if the first key pri or ity for the Pol ish Pres i dency
(“Eu ro pean in te gra tion as a source of growth”) were to also cover en ergy
 issues, be cause these are bound to ex ert a pro found in flu ence on the
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 economic de vel op ment of the EU over the next few years and in the de cades
ahead.
As for “the strength en ing of the EU’s ex ter nal en ergy pol icy”, em pha sis
should be placed here on fu ture re la tions with North Af ri can coun tries, es pe -
cially in view of the lat est de vel op ments in this re gion.
Be well pre pared
Be fore tak ing over the Pres i dency, Po land ought to do ev ery thing in its
power to im ple ment the third en ergy pack age by means of the nec es sary
amend ments to the na tional leg is la tion. Then, dur ing the Pres i dency, Po land
ought to sup port this same pro cess in other Mem ber States. It should also take
ad van tage of all the op por tu ni ties af forded by the es tab lish ment of the En ergy
Com mu nity. There fore, Po land should join this or gani sa tion as soon as pos si -
ble and sup port the Eu ro pean Com mis sion in its ef forts to wards en sur ing that
Moldova and Ukraine ful fil their com mit ments within the En ergy Com mu nity. 
With out to tal ded i ca tion to im ple men ta tion of the third en ergy pack age by
means of amend ments to the na tional leg is la tion and sec ondly, ac ces sion to the 
En ergy Com mu nity, Po land’s cred i bil ity in terms of en ergy is sues, par tic u -
larly those re lat ing to the ex ter nal di men sion of the EU’s en ergy pol icy, is
bound to suf fer.
Sup port adop tion of a reg u la tion on de vis ing 
an in fra struc ture in stru ment
Po land should seek to en sure that the Coun cil of the Eu ro pean Un ion
adopts as soon as pos si ble a reg u la tion on de vis ing an in fra struc ture in stru -
ment. This is of par a mount im por tance for Po land, Cen tral and East ern Eu rope
and the EU as a whole.
Sup port en ergy ef fi ciency mea sures
Po land should sup port the Eu ro pean Com mis sion in its ef forts to wards the
adop tion of en ergy ef fi ciency leg is la tion fol low ing the Com mis sion’s pub li ca -
tion of its Eu ro pean En ergy Ef fi ciency Plan in March of this year.8 It would be
nat u ral for Po land to do so, since im prov ing en ergy ef fi ciency is af ter all listed
among the pri or i ties of the above-men tioned “En ergy Strat egy of Po land un til
2030”.
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Don’t for get about Durban
Po land should ac tively par tic i pate in the de vel op ment of an EU po si tion for 
the Durban con fer ence. As the Mem ber State hold ing the Pres i dency, Po land
ought to adopt the stance of an im par tial ar bi ter to wards the dis pa rate po si tions 
of the var i ous EU in sti tu tions and in di vid ual Mem ber States.
Only a com pre hen sive ap proach to the EU’s en ergy pol icy will se cure
the achievement of goals that are so im por tant for both Po land and the EU
as a whole. It would be a se ri ous mis take if, dur ing the Pol ish Pres i dency,
the Polish Gov ern ment were to con cern it self only with “the strength en ing of
the EU’s ex ter nal en ergy pol icy”. Such an ap proach would only fur ther re in -
force the ste reo type of Po land as a coun try whose per spec tive on en ergy is sues
cen tres around its own en ergy se cu rity, re luc tant to em brace the EU’s en ergy
pol icy as a whole.
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Vladi mir Bartovic, Eckart D. Stratenschulte, 
Pawe³ Samecki, Támas Szemler
The Pol ish EU Pres i dency and the ne go ti a tions
on the Multiannual Fi nan cial Frame work
2014-2020
Transcript of debate from the conference: 
Energy and the budget as priorites of the Polish EU Presidency
The prospect of Visgrad countries and Germany
Jacek Kucharczyk1: As al ways, I would like to start by thank ing our part -
ners and spon sors with out whom this con fer ence would n’t have hap pened.
Our part ners in this con fer ence and the pro ject in clude EUROPEUM In sti tute
for Eu ro pean Pol icy from Prague, which is a well-known Czech think tank
work ing on is sues of Eu ro pean in te gra tion, and we have a very long track
 record of co op er a tion with EUROPEUM. I think more than ten years we’ve
been work ing to gether do ing some suc cess ful pro jects, so I would like to thank 
Vladi mir Bartovic, who is rep re sent ing EUROPEUM here. I would also like to 
thank two other part ners: the Cen tre for EU En large ment Stud ies at the Cen tral 
Eu ro pean Uni ver sity in Bu da pest which is also our trusted part ner with whom
we’ve worked to gether for some time and last, but not least, the Eu ro pean
Acad emy from Berlin, a well-known cen tre of Eu ro pean de bate and learn ing
ed u ca tion from Ger many. I also would like to thank our spon sors: the In ter na -
tional Visegrad Fund and the Foun da tion of Ger man-Pol ish Co op er a tion.
 Because this con fer ence has an in ter na tional scope, we be lieve that the de bate
about the pri or i ties of the Pol ish pres i dency should not only con cern us here in
Po land and we should not only de bate here, but also with our col leagues and
part ners from other coun tries, es pe cially with those coun tries which are very
im por tant for Pol ish-Eu ro pean pol icy as it has been fre quently de clared by
1  Ja cek Ku cha r czyk is a Pre si dent of the Exe cu ti ve Bo ard of the In sti tu te of Pu b lic Af fa irs
in Wa r saw.
Pol ish for eign min is ter and by the Pol ish gov ern ment about the im por tance of
Ger many and the Visegrad coun tries as our part ners in Eu rope and coun tries
with whom we want to work to pro mote Pol ish vi sion and Pol ish per spec tives
of Eu ro pean in te gra tion. Es pe cially now in this cru cial mo ment – that is, just
be fore the Pol ish pres i dency. We also be lieve that the Pol ish pres i dency is not
a tech ni cal is sue, it is an is sue of pub lic in ter est and pub lic de bate on all the
 priorities whose pre lim i nary list has al ready been an nounced, and it is very
 important that the cit i zens should be in formed and have a chance to con trib ute
to all the de bates re lated to the aims of the pres i dency. The pri or i ties which we
have cho sen for to day’s con fer ence seem par tic u larly dif fi cult. Maybe I should 
say other pri or i ties are not easy ei ther, but in this case we have what seems like
a cer tain con tra dic tion. It is widely re cog nised that the Pol ish pres i dency will
be suc cess ful only if Po land acts and is per ceived as a so-called hon est bro ker,
a coun try which seeks agree ments and com mon de nom i na tors for all the Eu ro -
pean in ter ests and per spec tives. At the same time, both is sues – bud get and
 energy pol icy – are very im por tant for Po land. We have very, or let’s say rel a -
tively, clearly de fined in ter ests in those fields and by no means all those in ter -
ests are iden ti cal with all EU mem ber states. So, def i nitely these are the two
top ics where ex perts and cit i zens should also be in formed and de bate, and we
have to have at least a good un der stand ing of both the sim i lar i ties and dif fer -
ences as re gards these pri or i ties. As in deed goes about the other pri or i ties,
I suppose that it would be true. With out tak ing much more of your time I will
now hand over the mod er a tion of the first panel which is de voted to the fi nan -
cial per spec tive. I would ask Vladi mir Bartovic from EUROPEUM to in tro -
duce the pan el ists and mod er ate the dis cus sion. I should also say thanks to all
the pan el ists who agreed to come to War saw and be with us and share their
knowl edge and their per spec tives with us. So, thank you very much once
again. Thank you for com ing here and I hand over to Vladi mir.  
Vladi mir Bartovic2: Thank you Jacek. Thank you Instytut Spraw
Publicznych for in vit ing me per son ally to War saw to chair this panel and also
for in clud ing EUROPEUM from Prague in this pro ject. This is a very im por -
tant and in ter est ing con fer ence. La dies and gen tle men, let me wel come you on
the first panel which is de voted to the EU bud get and es pe cially to the
multiannual fi nan cial frame work for the next – we still don’t know how many
– years. But first of all, I would like to in tro duce the pan el ists of this first panel. 
On my right is Prof. Dr. Eckart Stratenschulte, Di rec tor of the Eu ro pean Acad -
emy in Berlin, on my far left is Dr. Pawe³ Samecki, ad vi sor to the Pres i dent of
the Na tional Bank of Po land and on my di rect left is Dr. Tamás Szemler, se nior 
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re search fel low from ICEG Eu ro pean Cen tre from Hun gary. All the gen tle men 
pres ent in this panel will be tack ling the same is sue and they will be an swer ing
very burn ing ques tions I hope you might have about the next fi nan cial per spec -
tive and es pe cially in re la tion with the up com ing Pol ish pres i dency, which will 
be the one re spon si ble for open ing this ques tion. The new fi nan cial per spec tive 
for the next pe riod will be for the first time ne go ti ated un der the new le gal
frame work set up by the Lis bon Treaty. Will there be any con se quences on this 
in stru ment’s le gal setup? Will we have the im pact on the ne go ti a tions and on
the re sult of the ne go ti a tions? This is the first ques tion. An other ques tion
which may arise: How will the eco nomic cri sis which is now still pres ent in the 
European Un ion and is also trans form ing it self to the debt cri sis in the sov er eign
states in the EU ef fect the pre pared ness and the abil ity of the mem ber states to
 reform the next fi nan cial per spec tive? Very dif fer ent are the in ter ests of the
mem ber states, even in side the group of the new com ers or the Visegrad coun -
tries. Is there any chance for a com mon space for at least the Visegrad group
to coordinate or to set up a com mon ap proach to the ne go ti a tions? Ex tremely
im por tant is the ques tion of the rev e nue side and of the in tro duc tion of the
com mon Eu ro pean taxes which would re place the very crit i cized cur rent VAT
re source. And most im por tant – what will be ex pected from the Pol ish pres i -
dency? Can it act as Jacek en vis ages as a hon est bro ker, or is the par tic u lar
 interest of Po land so strong that this won’t be 100% pos si ble? I’ll stop here
with my ques tions. I will ask pan el ists to start with their short pre sen ta tions
and af ter wards we’ll open the floor for the dis cus sions be tween pan el ists and
your com ments and ques tions. Thank you very much for com ing here and now
I would like to pass the floor over to Pro fes sor Stratenschulte. 
Eckart D. Stratenschulte3: Thank you very much. Good morn ing la dies
and gen tle men. First of all, I would like to thank the or gan is ers for the in vi ta -
tion. It is al ways a plea sure to be here in War saw. It is such a nice morn ing,
so therefore it re ally is a pity that we have to talk about the bud get. It has
 become a good prac tice that be fore tak ing over the pres i dency you talk about
the pro gram of the pres i dency. How ever, as we learn from his tory the agenda
of the pres i dency is not made by the coun try run ning the pres i dency but by
 topicality and re al ity – and mostly things turn out to be very dif fer ent from the
orig i nal plans. So, this is our ex pe ri ence and I dare to guess that it will also
 happen in Po land. None the less, we should think about the main top ics of the
pres i dency. Of course one im por tant topic is the bud get and in par tic u lar the
 financial per spec tive for the next years. For the time be ing we will leave the
ques tion whether it will be the pe riod from 2014 to 2020 aside and come back
to it later. 
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I would like to state four points. First of all, I would like to say that the
ques tion of the frame work or rather how the new frame work in flu ences the
bud get ne go ti a tions is a typ i cal in sider ques tion. In my view what is re ally at
stake is the ques tion of the ac cep tance of the Eu ro pean Un ion by its cit i zens.
And here we have a se vere prob lem. I even would go as far as to say this is the
main prob lem. The ques tion is not whether we are deal ing with the Lis bon
Treaty, or the Nice Treaty, or this or that mech a nism. 
In Ger many it can be ob served that more and more peo ple lose their faith
and their trust in the Eu ro pean Un ion. This ten dency can also be seen in other
coun tries. There fore I think that the main topic of the bud get dis cus sion will be 
to ad dress these feel ings and to in crease peo ple’s ac cep tance of the Eu ro pean
Un ion. It is true, when we talk about the bud get and in par tic u lar about the pre -
view for the years to come we talk about rev e nue and spend ing, that is, both
sides of the bud get. One thing is very ob vi ous: you can not have a bud get in
which 27 coun tries put some money in and get more out. This will not work.
And to or gan ise it as a zero-sum game, so that ev ery body gets ex actly out what
he has paid in would not make sense. There will be al ways net pay ers and net
ben e fi cia ries and this will not change. Of course the net pay ers are less and less 
happy with this sit u a tion. But we can not avoid dis cuss ing this ques tion. Plans
by the Eu ro pean Com mis sion to in tro duce a dif fer ent way of in creas ing rev e -
nue by di rect Eu ro pean taxes will not lead any where at the mo ment. It would
only pro duce head lines in our news pa pers such as: “New taxes from Brussels”. 
One has to be care ful to talk about new Eu ro pean taxes and con sider their risks. 
One risk is of course that the rev e nue is in creas ing and de creas ing. We do not
have this prob lem at the mo ment in the Eu ro pean bud get. We should dis con -
nect the topic of Eu ro pean taxes from the ques tion of the bud get for the years
2014 to 2020 be cause it is not an in stru ment to avoid the net payer dis cus sion.
This topic needs to be ad dressed and dis cussed openly. 
My sec ond point is that we need to have an open de bate on the new bud get
lines. This de bate should fo cus on sol i dar ity and ef fec tive ness, which is more
than just ef fi ciency. Ef fi ciency is to do things right, ef fec tive ness is to do the
right things. So, here we are talk ing about ef fec tive ness, trans par ency and
the common good we have in the Eu ro pean Un ion. These are the cri te ria for
the bud get dis cus sion. The new bud get lines should not be dis cussed un der the
prem ise whether Po land gets three bil lion more or less, or whether Ger many
has to pay one bil lion more or less. This would be the wrong ap proach. The
right an gle from which to look at the main top ics is how do we ben e fit jointly
by strength en ing sol i dar ity, ef fec tive ness and trans par ency. 
Look ing at the Eu ro pean agenda one thing be comes ob vi ous: The main
tasks in the next years will be the de crease of the na tional debts and the res cue
of the Euro. These are the is sues at stake. Any thing else is a dif fer ent part,
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a less im por tant part of the agenda. Here we talk about the fu ture of the Euro
and this also means talk ing about na tional debts. Eu rope 2020 and the Euro
Plus Pact are the im por tant doc u ments and they form the ba sis for the dis cus -
sion about the Eu ro pean Un ion in the next years. They make up the back drop
against which the new bud get lines have to be dis cussed.
If you want to de crease na tional debts, it is very dif fi cult to say that more
has to be paid into the Eu ro pean bud get. One way or the other this would be
an ex tra bur den for the na tional bud get. As this is very clear the main ques -
tion is: Does it serve the pur pose and does it serve Eu rope 2020? Eu rope
2020 is plan B, plan A was the Lis bon pro cess which has failed. This is not
the fo rum to dis cuss whether this fail ure was 100 per cent or – as the Com -
mis sion sees it – only 75 per cent. Eu rope 2020 is our last chance to re gain
com pet i tive ness. This is a les son learnt form the Greek cri sis and also from
the Por tu guese cri sis. It is not only a debt prob lem, it is also a pro duc tiv ity
prob lem. Even if we had the money to bail out the Greeks com pletely and
leave them with zero debt, they would be in the same sit u a tion in a cou ple of
years if they do not gain pro duc tiv ity. A per son who has 1000 Euro per
month to spend and keeps spend ing 1200 per month has to do some thing
about it. Eu rope 2020 is ex tremely im por tant for re gain ing com pet i tive ness
for the Eu ro pean Un ion as a whole and will there fore be the main fo cus of the
bud get dis cus sion. 
My last point is: What can the Pol ish pres i dency do? Well, frankly, not
much. Be cause it is too early for the fi nal com pro mise on the new bud get un der 
the new fi nan cial frame work. It is not how the Eu ro pean Un ion works. This is
not the Pol ish fault. But no head of state or gov ern ment would agree on the
new bud get line for 2014 in 2011 un less his or her coun try is a very clear ben e -
fi ciary of that. But it will not be that easy. It is too early for a so lu tion. This is
very ob vi ous and this is not good news be cause the Pol ish pres i dency is fol -
lowed by the Dan ish pres i dency, then by the pres i dency of Cy prus. In 2013 it
is not get ting much better when Ire land and Lith u a nia will take over. In 2014,
when the new bud get line ap plies, it will be Greece’s turn. It is there fore most
likely that the de ci sions will not be made un der the aus pices of the ro tat ing
pres i dency. This is very ob vi ous be cause Po land is the last heavy weight in this 
round and even this heavy weight is a bit dam aged be cause it is not part of the
Eurozone. More over, the whole un der tak ing is fo cussed on the Euro and it is
ev i dent that in the EU  every coun try which is not part of the Eurozone is los ing
in flu ence.
But as it is too early for a so lu tion, the ques tion that needs to be asked is
what can the Pol ish pres i dency do? There are two pos si bil i ties. Num ber one:
take it off the agenda and leave it to Cy prus. Good luck with that. Num ber 2:
launch a pub lic de bate about the prin ci ples of the bud get. Of course, it is op tion 
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num ber two that would be my sug ges tion. This is what is re ally needed. We do
not need the ne go ti a tions in the dark rooms of the Brussels ma chin ery. What
we need now is to re gain ac cep tance of the EU and to make clear to peo ple that
the Eu ro pean money is spent in a use ful way. We need this pub lic dis cus sion,
and Po land as a big coun try has some in stru ments for pub lic di plo macy at its
dis posal. The em bas sies, cul tural in sti tutes, mul ti pli ers and con tacts may be
used. Cy prus could not do that even if it wanted to. My an swer to the ques tion
of what the Pol ish pres i dency could do would be to start this pub lic de bate. Get 
away from who gets how much and come to the prin ci ples of spend ing. What
are the prin ci ples of gain ing the rev e nue? How do we guar an tee trans par ency
and sol i dar ity, and how to in crease ef fec tive ness? Those who put money into
the jack pot do ex pect that those who take it out make good and sen si ble use
of it: Sol i dar ity is also a two-way street. If this de bate could be started by
the Pol ish pres i dency it would do a lot for safe guard ing the fu ture of the
 European Un ion.
Bartovic: Thank you pro fes sor. I very much liked your pre sen ta tion, es pe -
cially the point you made about the cit i zens and the dis cus sions in the EU which
re flects the opin ions of cit i zens about the Eu ro pean Un ion. I can see in your pre -
sen ta tion some con tra dict ing points. On one side, we have cit i zens who are los -
ing their faith in the EU and, for ex am ple, in tro duc ing the new  European taxes
would not help this sit u a tion. And on the other hand, there are bank rupt ing states 
which may like the Eu ro pean taxes thus ec ono mis ing in their own bud gets. At
the be gin ning it looked like the Pol ish pres i dency in case of the bud get can’t
re ally do any thing, but at the end you showed the way, which I also ap pre ci -
ated. I’m just won der ing if at the end all the good will to dis cuss the prin ci ple
will not end in horse trad ing about this one one bil lion euro here, one bil lion
euro there. But that’s prob a bly just only my wish. Now I’ll be hand ing the
floor over to doc tor Pawe³ Samecki who maybe has higher ex pec ta tions from
the Pol ish pres i dency. 
Pawe³ Samecki4: Thank you for in vit ing me. Pro fes sor Stratenschulte fo -
cused on the prin ci ples, the pro cess, and the cli mate of ne go ti a tions. I’ll speak
more about the sub stance, but I’ll try not to be too tech ni cal. I’ll try to re fer
to ques tions posed by the organizsers and also men tioned by the mod er a tor.
The first ques tion is, do we need re forms of the EU bud get? My as sump tion is,
if we make an iden tity line be tween re forms and changes – changes hope fully
for the better – that yes, we do need re forms, we do need changes, pro vided
that we con tinue to be lieve there is a need for con ti nu ity of Eu ro pean in te gra -
tion and pro vid ing that we be lieve in cost-ef fec tive ness of pub lic spend ing
26 V. Bartovic, E.D. Stratenschulte, P. Samecki, T. Szemler
4  Pawe³ Sa me cki is an Ad vi ser to the Pre si dent of the Na tio nal Bank of Po land.
from the EU bud get, which is not nec es sary the case. It is very fre quently
doubted. So, pro vid ing that those two con di tions are met, there are at least
three rea sons for re forms. One is the con text of post-cri sis en vi ron ment in
which there is a lot of pres sure on na tional gov ern ments to con sol i date fis cally. 
And in deed, this is a jus ti fied pres sure, I agree with the pro fes sor. To avoid
these con straints com ing from na tional con sol i da tion pres sures we need to look
for in no va tive sources of fi nanc ing. Sec ondly, on the ex pen di tures side, of
course, it is again true that we need re forms as we adopted last year the new strat -
egy for the Eu ro pean Un ion in the form of Eu rope 2020. I’m not par tic u larly
fond of this strat egy but since we adopted it last year, we need to take it into ac -
count and we need to make it a kind of back bone for think ing about  future
spend ing from the EU bud get. Thirdly, we need to take into ac count and re flect
about the de vel op ments in the ex ter nal en vi ron ment. This is also ob vi ous. 
About the rev e nue side, I clearly see the need for look ing for new in no -
va tive sources of fi nanc ing. I don’t want to dis cuss them in de tail, they’re
quite nicely and shortly de scribed in the pa per pro vided by the mod er at ing
or gan iser. I just want to say that I sub scribe to the view ex pressed in some
Eu ro pean Com mis sion doc u ments that those new sources make sense par -
tic u larly where the ad di tional rev e nue com ing from a given source is
 accompanied by a pos i tive side ef fect in the form of a kind of pub lic good.
For ex am ple, if we think about a levy or a tax on fi nan cial in sti tu tions,
the  financial sec tor or fi nan cial trans ac tions, apart from the ad di tional
 resources such a tax would cre ate, it would pro vide for the pub lic good in
the form of, for ex am ple, in creased sta bil ity of fi nan cial mar kets. Or if we
think, for  example, of an in stru ment in the form of a levy on risks that are
taken by the fi nan cial en ti ties. Again, if such an in stru ment gives not only
ad di tional  resources, but also mit i gates the risks taken by those en ti ties, it
will be better. That’s why I be lieve that the very sense is to look at the spec -
trum or pal ette of new fi nan cial in stru ments and to adopt those that ful fill
the con di tions like the ones men tioned be fore. 
Now, a few words about the ex pen di ture side. And here I would like to
pres ent a ta ble which looks a bit com pli cated, but is not in fact. The cen tral
 column is most im por tant, as it pres ents my guess – my as sump tion about what
the next pri or i ties for the next fi nan cial per spec tive will be. My guess is not
based only on my own think ing. It is based upon, firstly, what is in side of
 Europe 2020 and fur ther more, it is based on pri or ity ar eas sig naled in the EU
bud get re view from Oc to ber last year, namely the three types of growth: smart, 
sus tain able and in clu sive, then cit i zen ship, global Eu rope and ad min is tra tion.
We can look at this list of pri or i ties and com pare it with the left-hand  column
which con tains head ings from the cur rent per spec tive.
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2007-2013 Post-2013 (based on The EUBudget Review, Oct. 2010)
Net
Payers
Net
Beneficiaries
1a. Competitiveness Smart growth: k g
1b. Cohesion for Growth
and Employment
– R&D, education m k
– Infrastructure (transport,
telecom, energy)
some elements of 1b.
Cohesion/1a.
Competitiveness
Sustainable growth: k m
2. Preservation and Mgmt
of Natural Resources
– Counteracting climate
change, energy saving
& energy security 
g g
– CAP
1b. Cohesion for Growth
and Employment
Inclusive growth:
Cohesion policy
m g
3. Citizenship, freedom… Citizenship
(incl. migration) 
k g
1b. Cohesion for Growth… Pre-accession aid m g
4. EU as a global player Global Europe 
(ext. aid, ENPI)
k g
5. Administration Administration i or m g or m
My con clu sion is, if Eu rope 2020 is to be come the back bone of the new bud -
get, which I as sume it should, then there is a kind of con ti nu ity with the cur rent
per spec tive. Be cause again, al most all new head ings, all new chap ters in the
post-2013 per spec tive are more or less re flected in the past. The only  exception
is cli mate change and en ergy se cu rity which are some what dif fer ent from the
past. But the rest is more or less the same, grouped in a dif fer ent way and pre -
sented in a dif fer ent man ner. So, in this sense there is a lot of con ti nu ity in
 Europe 2020 as com pared to the Lis bon strat egy. I’m not say ing whether it’s
good or bad but sim ply that’s my per cep tion. So, if at the level of broad pri or ity
ar eas there’s lot of con ti nu ity, then the devil is in the de tails – in side in di vid ual
pri or ity ar eas. And here we have real ques tions on how to re con struct, how to re -
shape, how to re de sign co he sion pol icy to en sure that it has in deed a mod ern is -
ing im pact on lag ging re gions. Or an other im por tant ques tion: how to en sure that 
the Com mon Ag ri cul tural Pol icy is mod ern ized so that it loses its neg a tive side
ef fects in the form of pet ri fi ca tion of ob so lete struc tures in lag ging  regions.
These are the ques tions which we should fo cus on in the fu ture. And my last re -
mark con cern ing the spend ing side is that when we look at the red color on the
left hand side, these are places where co he sion pol icy ap pears. I was re spon si ble
for co he sion pol icy for quite a long time in the Pol ish ad min is tra tion and later in
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Brussels, that’s why I pay par tic u lar at ten tion to this is sue. And here you can see
that in the post-2013 pe riod, in the next fi nan cial per spec tive, there is a lot of
 reference to co he sion pol icy. I’m afraid there are too many  references to
the  cohesion pol icy which leads me to the con clu sion that prob a bly there will be
a kind of a pro lif er a tion of tasks, aims, ob jec tives to be put on the shoul ders of
co he sion pol icy. This pol icy might be over bur dened with too many ideas and
be come a basket for ev ery thing, which should not be the case. But it’s my fear.
As to po si tions and in di vid ual groups of mem ber states, I think that’s a rel a -
tively easy guess. Again when we look at the right hand col umns, these are my
as sess ments of po si tions of in di vid ual pay ers, or groups of net pay ers vs. net
ben e fi cia ries. There are few places where the di rec tion of in ten tions is sim i lar or
the same. In fact, in many places the di rec tion is of dif fer ent na ture. That’s why
I think it’s sim ply nat u ral that the net pay ers have dif fer ent po si tions as com -
pared to net ben e fi cia ries. We sim ply have to con clude that there will be tough
ne go ti a tions ahead, but this is busi ness as usual. It has al ways been the case. One
ref er ence to the Pol ish pres i dency: As you know I’m a Pole so I should be
an “hon est pan el ist” and I don’t want to as sess Po land. But my im pres sion is
sim ply that Po land will be in an un easy sit u a tion be cause Po land or Pol ish
 authorities would like to be a de fender of at least the sta tus quo in the bud get and 
I pre sume that the Pol ish au thor i ties would like to be quite vo cal about it. But of
course to com bine this with the task of an hon est bro ker is im pos si ble, that’s why 
I be lieve that the sec ond half of this year will be spent on a kind of re con nais -
sance, feel ing, touch ing and try ing to learn about the po si tions of other coun -
tries. I’m not say ing this is a waste of time, but sim ply it will be a good pe riod for 
re flec tion about the po si tions of dif fer ent coun tries and think ing about de tails
and pri or i ties in in di vid ual pol icy ar eas and how they should be con structed. 
Now a few words about how I see the de sired fu ture of the next multiannual 
fi nan cial per spec tive. This is not an ex haus tive list of de sired fea tures but
I would like to pay at ten tion to a few is sues. I be lieve that the bud get should be
fi nanced to a pos si ble ex tent by in no va tive sources, al though it will not be
easy. It should be much fo cused on pri or ity ar eas and again on Eu rope 2020.
This is some thing what we have at our dis posal and we should pur sue it.
It should be more flex i ble. I be lieve that a shorter ho ri zon will be better
 because the world keeps chang ing so fast. The fi nan cial cri ses show there are
so many un fore seen events in the world and that in or der to re spond to them,
we need more flex i bil ity. And more flex i bil ity would be given by a shorter
 horizon and by some kind of con tin gency ar range ments in side the bud get.
It should be sim pler in terms of man age ment rules. Many prin ci ples in side the
bud get, in clud ing prin ci ples and rules of ex pen di ture, should be harmonised or 
uni ver sal. This is a pos tu late which has been pro posed for many years but still
is not ful filled in a sat is fac tory man ner, and I be lieve is a bit con trary to what
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the pro fes sor said about that. The bud get should be big ger and I’m not speak -
ing on be half of new mem ber states or on be half of ben e fi ciary coun tries.
I think it should be big ger be cause the Un ion at the EU level does n’t have any
kind of sub sti tute for com mon fis cal pol icy and this is par tic u larly about the
EMU. It’s not about the new mem ber states, it’s about the EMU. The fact that
the EMU does n’t have a sub sti tute for fis cal is a weak ness. In the United States
at the fed eral bud get level – of course they’re a dif fer ent coun try, it’s a fed er a -
tion – they have a lot of in stru ments al low ing for fis cal trans fers this way or
that way us ing dif fer ent in stru ments. But they do have fis cal fed er al ism. With
com plete lack of fis cal fed er al ism here in Eu rope, the EMU is weak. And that’s 
why with an in creas ing num ber of mem ber states in side the EMU and with
 increasing het er o ge ne ity of the EMU area there is a need for a sub sti tute.
Of course we still speak of stron ger co or di na tion of eco nomic pol i cies within
the con cept of stron ger eco nomic gov er nance in side the EU. That’s true. But
still it is far from fis cal un ion and I be lieve that this is not a suf fi cient con di tion
for mak ing the EU stron ger. That’s why prob a bly a big ger bud get would serve
the EMU coun tries as well as the other ben e fi ciary coun tries. 
Now – my last slide – with a few spec u la tions on what is pos si ble as an out -
come. Well, I think on the rev e nue side, the old sources will pre vail al though
I believe there will be some room for grad u ally phas ing in some new sources
like lev ies or charges in the fi nan cial sec tor. On the ex pen di ture side, I be lieve
that the out come will be in deed a greater fo cus on Eu rope 2020, but again there 
will be a lot of small com pro mises here and there and this fo cus will be spoiled
by such com pro mises I’m afraid. I’m afraid ei ther that the idea of a lon ger ho ri -
zon, for in stance a 10-year per spec tive with a mid term re view, will be prob a -
bly adopted. That’s not a fear, but sim ply I would pre fer the short term so lu tion 
rather than long term. We need man age ment rules to be sim pli fied, but again,
the seg men ta tion of the bud get into ti tles, head lines, and so on, run by in di vid -
ual di rec tor ates-gen eral make it dif fi cult to go far in this re spect. And
as  regards the size of the bud get, my pos tu late will not be taken on board.
I would say that pre serv ing the sta tus quo in rel a tive terms would prob a bly be
an achieve ment. I don’t think that there are any chances for any in crease in the
bud get in rel a tive terms. And that’s my fi nal re mark. Thank you. 
 
Bartovic: Thank you very much, doc tor Samecki. I’m glad that we have the
first con tro versy in this panel and I hope we will have the chance to con tinue dis -
cuss ing this par tic u lar is sue. I found very im por tant one of the re sults of your own
re search dis played in the ta ble you have pre sented which sug gests that any re sult
of the ne go ti a tions will not change sub stan tially the sit u a tion of net re cip i ents.
In most cases it will re main more or less the same and in some ar eas will be
slightly better. I could see only one or two ar eas where the sit u a tion could worsen.
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But maybe you can com ment on that later on. I also found in ter est ing your per -
sonal opin ion that the pri or ity is re form of both the rev e nue side and also the ex -
pen di ture side. I can just add that the Czech po si tion is very cau tious with new EU
taxes, new rev e nues. We pre fer the GNI rev e nue  remaining the main source of
rev e nue. On the ex pen di ture side it looks like the Czech Re pub lic un der stands the
ne go ti a tions as a game be tween the sup port of com mon ag ri cul tural pol icy and
 cohesion and that ev ery re cip i ent has to  decide be tween these two. The Czech
 Republic has opted for co he sion pol icy. OK, that was my re mark and now I would
like to ask doc tor Tamás Szemler from Hun gary to start with his pre sen ta tion.
Tamás Szemlér5: Thank you very much. Good morn ing la dies and gen tle -
men. I can not prom ise you that I will solve all the prob lems of the bud get in
10 or 15 min utes; of course, if I could have 25 min utes for that I could do it.
I come from the In ter na tional Cen ter for Eco nomic Growth. It’s an in de pend -
ent in sti tute based in Bu da pest. I’m very grate ful for the in vi ta tion and I would
like to thank the organizsers. When I looked at the pro gram and the top ics of
this event, I was think ing about these two main top ics: bud get and en ergy.
For ex am ple, it could be a good ques tion but I can’t an swer that: Will there be
an EU bud get for en ergy? I don’t know but I still hope you have some en ergy
so I’ll con tinue to speak about bud get a lit tle bit. I would like to raise some
 issues that are par tially over lap ping with is sues raised by the two speak ers who 
spoke be fore me. But I hope I can add some thing to that. First of all, I would
like to raise the ques tion of what the op ti mal EU bud get looks like. Well, you
know a lot of peo ple have seen op ti mal EU bud gets but their vi sions are dif fer -
ent. Just like vi sions of the Loch Ness mon ster that are widely avail able on the
internet. So, there are dif fer ent op tions. How can we pro ceed? How can we go
to wards some thing which is maybe not op ti mal but better than what we have at 
pres ent stage? Or to for mu late it in the way that Pawe³ Samecki for mu lated it:
Do we need re form? Let’s start from the pres ent sit u a tion. What does this EU
bud get look like? What are the main prob lems? I can’t list all of the prob lems,
so I’ll list some of them. First, with re gard to the sys tem of own re sources,
 according to some ba sic cri te ria set for many years by the Eu ro pean Com mis -
sion. Re gard ing sim plic ity and trans par ency, there are some very dif fi cult
mech a nisms like the ac tual VAT-base re source, but also rel a tively sim ple
 elements of the sys tem like the GNI re source. Re gard ing fi nan cial au ton omy:
it was one of the orig i nal ob jec tives of cre at ing the sys tem of own re sources
more than 40 years ago. Well, by now al most 90% of the fi nanc ing can not be
re garded as au ton o mous. Maybe it’s not a prac ti cal prob lem but it may be come 
a prac ti cal prob lem in the case of last ing eco nomic turbulences. The ques tion
of whether the sys tem of own re sources adds to the ef fi cient al lo ca tion of the
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eco nomic re sources is prac ti cally not an is sue when we talk about bud get now.
It’s an is sue the o ret i cally and I think it will be an im por tant is sue in the fu ture.
Re gard ing suf fi ciency, much de pends on the def i ni tion. What do you want to
do with this bud get, what are you ready to fi nance? It can be enough, even
from the point of view of some coun tries. For ex am ple from the net con tri bu -
tors’ view point it can be too much, while net re cip i ents can find good ar gu -
ments for in creas ing the size of the bud get. Ad min is tra tive cost ef fec tive ness
– and not just ef fi ciency – is also an im por tant ques tion: The an swer de pends
on what re sources we are speak ing about. Rev e nue sta bil ity is guar an teed by
the flex i bil ity of the GNI re source. From the point of view of eq uity and gross
con tri bu tions, the de vel op ments of the last de cade have shown a pos i tive
 tendency. Let’s look at the ex pen di tures side: Does it need to be re formed?
Well, in the pres ent fi nan cial per spec tive we have won der ful new head ings but 
with mostly old con tent. We have some sig nif i cant changes: CAP is no lon ger
head ing num ber one. It’s a very im por tant sub head ing, but al ready in the sec -
ond place af ter co he sion and com pet i tive ness taken to gether. And of course
the com pet i tive ness ob jec tive it self is some thing im por tant but still at the pres -
ent stage it is also a com pro mise, not a real an swer to some stra te gic or at least
long-term ques tions – for ex am ple, the ev er green de bate be tween the Com mon 
Ag ri cul tural Pol icy and UK re bates. So, it’s not the CAP ver sus co he sion but
CAP ver sus UK re bate and this ques tion will come back, I think, in the next
two years. Re gard ing the re la tion ship be tween the ob jec tives of co he sion and
competitivness, I put a ques tion mark whether it is co he sion ver sus com pet i -
tive ness or co he sion and com pet i tive ness. That is still an is sue as it was an is -
sue in 2002 – 2005, when the pres ent na tional po si tions were cre ated. Well, we 
have no new sys tem. If you look at the pres i dency con clu sions in  December
2005, it’s a jum ble of ex cep tions with points A, B, C, D and you can use the
whole al pha bet for such ex cep tions. And at the same time we have new chal -
lenges. I put a ques tion mark here as well. Be cause if some one reads the lit er a -
ture from the mid 1990’s, of course there’s lit er a ture avail able about the
ne ces sity of fi nanc ing EMU with some in stru ments, with some thing more.
Of course, also with Eu ro pean-level fis cal pol icy but there were also at tempts
to ar gue for bud get ary in stru ments as sist ing EMU. Now we had re ally hard
times, we had the cri sis, and these claims of course be came stron ger. But when
we think about these claims, let’s think about the re al ity. And just com pare the
size of the EU bud get, roughly one hun dred twenty to one hun dred thirty
 billion eu ros per year with just the size of the Por tu guese pack age, es ti mated
to be eighty bil lion euro. So, even if you re struc ture the EU bud get rad i cally
but its size re mains in its pres ent form, it does n’t re ally solve the prob lems
–  problems that are to be solved rap idly when they oc cur. So, we have to think
of some thing dif fer ent. Un for tu nately, maybe for tu nately for some, it’s not
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about the fed er a tion like in the case of the USA as Pawe³ Samecki has men -
tioned. It’s a dif fer ent per spec tive – it’s not Eu ro pean in te gra tion about which
the au thors of the MacDougall re port have dreamt in 1977. What did we do in
or der to im prove this sit u a tion? The de ci sion on the EU bud get re view that
would in clude pub lic con sul ta tion was adopted al ready as early as in 2005.
I have some doubts about the re sults of pub lic con sul ta tions in gen eral
 although there were many, many con tri bu tions. Af ter that it was up to the
 European Com mis sion to draw con clu sions but this was de layed due to many
things – due to the eco nomic cri sis, due to the Eu ro pean Par lia ment elec tions,
due to the ap point ment of the new Com mis sion. Then fi nally, in Oc to ber 2010
we got this com mu ni ca tion from the Com mis sion. In the mean time – and, of
course, it is im por tant in the con text of the cri sis and the re sponse of the Eu ro -
pean Un ion to the cri sis – we have the Eu rope 2020 Strat egy. And we know
 officially since Oc to ber 2010 that pro posal of the Eu ro pean Com mis sion for
the new fi nan cial frame work will be pub lished by June 2011. So, what do
we have? Be fore this pro posal, we don’t have very solid new in for ma tion.
We have the old one. What is in this Oc to ber 2010 doc u ment, very briefly,
con cern ing the own re source sys tem? “The con nec tion be tween the or i gin of
the re source and pol icy fi nanc ing has been lost, mak ing the sys tem less trans -
par ent and in creas ing doubts about its fair ness. A fresh look is es sen tial for
 realising the EU fi nanc ing prin ci ples of au ton omy, eco nomic trans par ency and 
fair ness.” Ba si cally, you have the same ques tions as ten years ago. In
2004–2005, we did n’t solve stra te gic prob lems – we solved the acute prob lem
and we had agree ment on the cur rent fi nan cial frame work. But the old prob -
lems are still there. Let’s look at the other side. Of course, the Eu rope 2020
Strat egy has been men tioned by both speak ers. It is also stated in the com mu ni -
ca tion which closed the pub lic con sul ta tions and re view of the EU bud get that
“the EU is com mit ted to the fun da men tal is sue of eco nomic re form, to un lock
the po ten tial of the EU econ omy to find new sources of growth and cre ate new
jobs”. In the Eu rope 2020 strat egy, you see all the seven main points and
I think we have a very nice struc ture there. The big ques tion – and I do agree
with those who are skep ti cal in this re spect – is how we’ll be able to fill in this
struc ture with con tent. If we build the EU bud get on a frame work with out
a sub stan tial new con tent, then it’s a se ri ous mis take. So, the old good ques tion 
co mes back, prob a bly you know it in one form or an other: How to re place the
juste re tour with a more con struc tive ap proach? Well, in a very log i cal way, to
re de fine the nec es sary pol i cies and on the ba sis of this agree ment, to cal cu late
the nec es sary size of the bud get and to cre ate the cor rect sys tem of fi nanc ing
with out ex cep tions – the prin ci ple is so sim ple. Of course, in prac tice it’s not
that sim ple. The net po si tions have al ready been men tioned and of course com -
mu ni cat ing all these de bates is very dif fi cult. But one el e ment of com mu ni ca -
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tion will be very im por tant: the net bal ance of Eu ro pean in te gra tion for any
mem ber state is not equal to the net po si tion vis--vis the EU bud get. This is
very im por tant. You can be gin with the first achieve ments of the Eu ro pean
 integration pro cess and con tinue with a lot of other achieve ments. The EU
bud get is an im por tant is sue but com pared to the other achieve ments it is a rel a -
tively small is sue, but of course it’s vis i ble. It’s tan gi ble for the pol i ti cians and
for the vot ers, so it of course de serves at ten tion. But we should think in terms
of the bal ance of Eu ro pean in te gra tion in a much broader sense. Of course this
re quest of avoid ing the juste re tour is some thing more fash ion able than ever
and the cri sis re in forced the hopes that this is pos si ble. Well, all coun tries are
in ter est driven. They take into ac count at least the in ter ests they per ceive as
vis i ble, tan gi ble and com mu ni ca ble. This is quite nor mal at the pres ent stage of 
in te gra tion, we have no fed er a tion and also the new mem bers are in ter est
driven within the EU. So, if we have such a sit u a tion, what are the chances for
changes, not for an earth quake in the EU bud get but for re forms? Of course cri -
sis les sons can change the at ti tude of coun tries and also in sti tu tional changes
can con trib ute to prog ress. All in all, I’m a bit skep ti cal but I also say, I’m try -
ing to be an op ti mist, so maybe we will see the re sult in the end of the pro cess
– so maybe if not an op ti mal but at least an im proved ver sion of the EU bud get.
Thank you very much for your at ten tion.  And if you have ques tions I’ll be
ready to an swer them. Thank you. 
Bartovic: Thank you very much Tamás. I found your pre sen ta tion again
very in ter est ing and thank you for a very use ful over view of the po si tions of
the big gest stake holders in the EU on the in di vid ual ques tions re lated to the
Eu ro pean bud get. I also found very im por tant your re marks on how to help or
the ques tion how to fill in the struc ture with the con tent. And if the con tent is
new, you men tioned that there will be a ne ces sity to re de fine the pol i cies in
 order to fill in the con tent, the struc ture in the right way. I may just doubt if
there is enough time now to think about the re def i ni tion of the in di vid ual pol i -
cies. That’s also lead ing to the ques tion of the new names of the bud get cat e go -
ries in the Com mis sion pro posal. If those are only la bels or if there is re ally
a change in side those cat e go ries. 
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The Eu ro pean Un ion En ergy Pol icy
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Transcript of debate from the conference: 
Energy and the budget as priorites of the Polish EU Presidency
The prospect of Visgrad countries and Germany
Grzegorz Gromadzki: Af ter the bud get dis cus sion we’re go ing to dis cuss
now is sues re lated to en ergy. First of all, I would like to in tro duce our pan el -
ists: Mr Kornél Andzsans-Balogh, Re gional Cen tre for En ergy Pol icy
 Research, Mr Petr Binhack, the head of the En ergy Se cu rity Group As so ci a -
tion for In ter na tional Af fairs in Prague and Mr Severin Fischer, re searcher
from the Ger man In sti tute for In ter na tional and Se cu rity Af fairs, from Berlin. 
Be fore I give the floor to the pan el ists, I would like to share with you
 several com ments. The fi nal shape of the pri or i ties of Pol ish pres i dency will
be known just a few days or a few weeks be fore its ini ti a tion, but there are
 proposals that are on the ta ble al ready. I’m think ing about the doc u ment that
was pub lished by the gov ern ment in mid March. These pro pos als most prob a -
bly will be the ba sis of the fi nal pri or i ties for this pres i dency. The en ergy
 related is sue is not a sep a rate pri or ity but is part of a broader pri or ity that has
been de fined as a Se cure Eu rope. Be sides this pri or ity, we’ve got two oth ers:
Eu ro pean in te gra tion as a source of de vel op ment, and in this we’ve also got
what was dis cussed dur ing the first panel Eu ro pean Un ion bud get, and the
third big pri or ity – Eu rope ben e fit ing from open ness. This is about en large -
ment of the Eu ro pean Un ion: Croatia and other Bal kan coun tries and is sues
 related to re la tion ships with neigh bours, es pe cially the East ern Part ner ship.
The Pol ish gov ern ment has se lected one is sue from among the is sues re lated to
en ergy. This is re lated with strength en ing the ex ter nal en ergy pol icy of the
 European Un ion. So, it’s not en ergy as the whole, but just one el e ment of the
EU en ergy pol icy. And I be lieve that it has n’t been ac ci den tal, I’m talk ing
about this choice for two rea sons. On the one hand, there is the dis cus sion
 concerning en ergy in Po land, things re lated to se cu rity and ac cess to raw
 materials. First of all, gas com ing from Rus sia. On the other hand, Po land is
very much afraid of changes tak ing place in the econ omy in the power sec tor.
Those changes that would be the con se quence of drop ping the us age of coal
be ing the main source of en ergy. I be lieve that we’re try ing to for get about
things re lated to the re duc tion of the CO2 and so the cli mate pol icy. This
 approach that the gov ern ment has pre sented is a very nar row ap proach to the
en ergy sec tor. Dur ing the Pol ish pres i dency in the sec ond half of this year we
should also have other things dis cussed, not only things re lated to en ergy is -
sues  related to ex ter nal re la tions of the Eu ro pean Un ion. We should also be
 focused on the in ter nal en ergy mar ket. The Com mis sion will pres ent a doc u -
ment con cern ing the fu ture of the en ergy pol icy of the Eu ro pean Un ion up to
the year 2050, so we should have a very se ri ous dis cus sion con cern ing what
the en ergy sec tor in the Eu ro pean Un ion should look like in the per spec tive of
sev eral  decades. At the end of the year in No vem ber and the be gin ning of the
De cem ber in Durban, the Cli mate Con fer ence is go ing to be held. And this will 
be of key im por tance, as it will al low us to fo cus on the re duc tion of CO2 and
this agree ment is go ing to re place the Kyoto Pro to col. The ques tion is whether
our pres i dency should re ally take care of these is sues that I’ve just enu mer ated. 
What sort of ini tia tives re lated to en ergy could Po land pro pose dur ing its pres i -
dency? Can we have a sort of con sen sus among the coun tries of Cen tral
 Europe? What are the ex pec ta tions and con cerns of our Eu ro pean Un ion
 partners? I mean the neigh bours of ours, the Visegrad Group coun tries or Ger -
many. In or der to wrap it up I would like to say that it’s worth ask ing whether
Po land should only be fo cus ing upon the EU en ergy pol icy in its ex ter nal
 dimension or should we re ally have a broader look at the en ergy sec tor? 
Kornél Andzsans-Balogh1: I work in Bu da pest at the Re gional Cen tre for
En ergy Pol icy Re search. Be fore I go on with the pre sen ta tion I would like to
say a few words about our re search cen tre. We’re an eco nom ics re search cen tre 
deal ing with study ing elec tric ity and gas mar ket reg u la tion and con duct ing
mar ket anal y sis. 
To day I was asked to give a per spec tive from the Cen tral and East ern Eu ro -
pean view point with a bit of fo cus on the Hun gar ian per spec tive. I gave the
 following ti tle to this pre sen ta tion: “The ques tion marks in EU en ergy pol icy”. 
En ergy pol icy in gen eral is a very broad topic of dif fer ent is sues and I’m
afraid I’ll dis ap point you be cause I won’t speak about two pop u lar top ics, one
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is nu clear en ergy – in clud ing Fukushima – and the other one is cli mate-change
pol icy. Why won’t I speak about nu clear en ergy? Po land does not have
a nuclear power sta tion, there fore even if there’ll be huge de bates on the EU
level in the next half – year on this is sue and there will be nu clear power plant
stress tests com ing up at the end of the year, all Po land can do is chair this
 debate. In my point of view if you don’t have a [nu clear] power plant, you can
be a successful chair of this de bate, but that is the end of your role . 
About cli mate change or cli mate pol icy I’m afraid I’m not able to speak
in depth, as these 10 min utes are not enough to cover this im por tant topic. So in -
stead, to day I would like to fo cus on the fol low ing: firstly, on the ex ter nal en ergy
pol icy of the EU, and then I will raise some is sues which are kind of  disappearing
from the de bate. One of these is Ukraine and the oth ers are some  internal is sues. 
Here, in East ern Eu rope, we like to re fer to the en ergy pol icy of the EU
as an in sur ance, as help to ad dress our en ergy se cu rity is sues. I would like to
stress that the en ergy pol icy is not only about en ergy se cu rity, how ever, here in 
our re gion it is al ways com ing back to en ergy se cu rity. We’re not as well 
 balanced – in the sense of sup ply and geo graph ical givens – as in the West,
there fore we have to ad dress these is sues prop erly on our own. Af ter Po land,
there won’t be many East ern Eu ro pean coun tries pre sid ing over the EU.
That is why we have to make the fi nal push right now in stead of just wait ing
and hop ing that some one else will ad dress these is sues. 
To con clude I’ll sum up some points, where Hun gar ian or Cen tral Eu ro -
pean in ter ests can meet dur ing the Pol ish pres i dency on EU ex ter nal en ergy
pol icy or EU en ergy pol icy in gen eral. 
There’s no en ergy pol icy – ex ter nal en ergy pol icy –writ ten yet in the EU.
The Com mis sion is draft ing one and the first draft will be out in June 2011.
Some coun tries al ready sent in their pub lic con sul ta tion sum ma ries. Po land
and the Czech Re pub lic are among them, Hun gary is not. It’s hard to speak
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Figure 1: Is EU’s External Energy Policy a Projection of the Internal Energy Policy
about some thing which is still be ing drafted. I would like to show you the EU
or EU-re lated programmes that are al ready on their way to ad dress en ergy
 policy is sues. Some of them have broader per spec tives, such as the Black Sea
Syn ergy, deal ing not only with en ergy is sues. As you see (Fig ure 1) all of these 
ini tia tives are very much fo cused on East ern and South-East ern Eu rope, the
Black Sea re gion, and the Cau ca sus. I did n’t write but prob a bly I should have
writ ten the North Af ri can coun tries or the Med i ter ra nean pro jects that the EU
has. Hav ing in mind the re cent events in North Af rica, en ergy def i nitely will
not be the most top i cal is sue through the Pol ish pres i dency. En ergy is sues
 related to North Af rica now will be frozen for a lit tle while, there fore we
should fo cus on East ern Eu rope. These in cen tives have been out there for
a couple of years and have re sults but prob a bly will have to be com bined
 together and make clearer path ways in the ex ter nal en ergy pol icy where these
main aims can be strength ened fur ther. Ukraine was re ally an im por tant topic
in 2006, 2009, but now in 2011, we’re speak ing less and less about Ukraine.
Why is this a prob lem? We think that the is sue is not re solved and we’re
slightly bored with talk ing about Ukraine. It’s get ting dif fi cult be cause the
 political en vi ron ment has changed there. I would like to draw your at ten tion to
one im por tant thing. 2010 gave a huge push and gave a per spec tive to in creas -
ing en ergy se cu rity for that part of Eu rope that re ceives gas through Ukraine.
Why? The IMF man aged to per suade Ukrai nian leg is la tors to im ple ment a gas
mar ket liberalisation act. This law stip u lates that the Ukrai nian gas mar ket
has to be unbundled un til 2015. One of the first dead lines is the end of this
year (open ing the mar ket for large cus tom ers). The law also fore sees the
unbundling of the Naftogas busi ness in sep a rate en ti ties (e.g., in trans por ta tion
and stor age). Pro duc tion and dis tri bu tion is al ready unbundled in Ukraine.
As the re cent events show in Ukraine, they’re not re ally mak ing an ef fort in
this re gard, there fore it will make sense if we don’t let this chance pass by but
 follow up with Ukraine and look af ter their pro cess of na tional mar ket
liberalisation. Why is this im por tant? The nat u ral gas mar ket in Ukraine is still
opaque, the liberalisation will not solve ev ery thing. How ever, it will be one
step for ward and these steps are needed to have a se cure tran sit coun try even
once the North Stream is in op er a tion. This al lows us to have a safer tran sit
coun try. Fur ther more, it also en hances the gas mar ket com pe ti tion in the East -
ern part of the EU. Ukraine can con trib ute to the com pe ti tion by hav ing the
larg est nat u ral gas stor age in the re gion. As a re sult ev ery body can ben e fit from 
this pol icy. 
Fur ther more, it was also men tioned in the in tro duc tion that from a Pol ish
per spec tive the en ergy/raw ma te ri als sup ply se cu rity is still un der de bate, and
that it is still per ceived as a prob lem. I came here to share some thoughts in this
re gard. One topic is: crude oil sup ply se cu rity. I don’t know if you’re  familiar
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with the ILF Con sult ing En gi neers’ re cent pa per which was look ing at eight
dif fer ent sce nar ios as to what could hap pen if the oil sup ply is cut on Druzhba.
Druzhba sup plies the oil for all East ern Eu ro pean coun tries. The study con -
cluded that with a rel a tively small amount of in vest ment, start ing from
10.3 mln eu ros, the sup ply se cu rity can be guar an teed for the en tire  region.
This means that al though we have the prob lem, we also know the so lu tion.
Now we have to im ple ment the mea sures. Oil sup ply se cu rity is not re ally
a huge is sue any more. 
Af ter the 2009 cri sis, there were many ac tions taken by the EU and by na -
tional gov ern ments. Reverseflows have been in tro duced on the pipe lines;
some coun tries built stra te gic storages; there are interconnectors drafted but
not yet built. We have to con tinue this work. There is a new Reg u la tion
No 994/2010/EC by the Eu ro pean  Parliament and of the Coun cil which fore -
sees risk as sess ment and ac tion plans. By 2014 ev ery thing has to be ready to
know the clear ac tion plans that have to be  implemented in a case of emer -
gency. The most im por tant de vel op ment in this re gard is the Com mis sion’s
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Fig ure 2: Sim u la tion of oil sup ply in ter rup tions on the Druzhba pipe line
Nat u ral gas se cu rity 
 supervision. It means that all nat u ral gas mar ket re lated long-term im port con -
tracts with third coun tries have to be sent to the Com mis sion for ap proval and
have to be su per vised by the Com mis sion to de ter mine whether these neg a tively
ef fect neigh bour ing coun tries. It is a sig nif i cant step for ward in re gards to trans -
par ency and in creas ing the ef fi ciency in side the EU. I Is the home work done?
Are we ready to guar an tee our en ergy safety with these na tional gas reg u la tions?
When we look at the Ukrai nian ex am ple which I showed you be fore, it is
clear that so far the EU ex ter nal en ergy pol icy has al ways been im ple ment ing
in ter nal pol icy to the ex ter nal di men sion. Through the En ergy Com mu nity
Frame work we’re urg ing neigh bour ing coun tries to im ple ment the same [en -
ergy] leg is la tion acts as we did a de cade ago in our own [en ergy] sec tors. It’s a
way of ex port ing in ter nal mea sure ments into the ex ter nal sphere. It does not al -
ways work, but it’s a good in ten tion. 
Each mem ber state’s duty is the con tin u a tion of open ing the nat u ral gas
mar ket. In the re gion na tional cham pi ons still ex ist, which is not good for com -
pe ti tion. The ben e fit of com pe ti tion is en hanc ing fur ther di ver si fi ca tion. 
In the reg u la tory en vi ron ment there are se ri ous is sues be cause build ing
new interconnectors won’t re solve the prob lem au to mat i cally; if there is no
third party ac cess guar an teed or the ca pac ity auc tion is not func tion ing prop -
erly, the free flow or se cu rity of sup ply can not be en tirely guar an teed. These
is sues have al ready been re cog nised and the de bates are on go ing. We have to
move on with these de bates and prop erly im ple ment leg is la tion. 
In elec tric ity, we have net work de vel op ment prob lems and some is sues that 
I hope my Ger man col league will ad dress as well. There are loop flows in the
re gional elec tric ity grid that are partly not caused in side the re gion but other
parts of the EU. The ques tion arises, who has to pay for the new net work de vel -
op ments? This is an im por tant de bate, though prob a bly not as ex cit ing as the
is sue of nat u ral gas. How ever, this is a de bate that has to be con cluded in the
next few years. 
Fi nally, I would like to pro vide the Hun gar ian per spec tive – I would like to
un der line that I’m not speak ing on be half of the Hun gar ian gov ern ment.
The signs [in Hun gary] are that the coun try will sup port ev ery thing that is
 related to en ergy ef fi ciency both in the EU in ter nal and ex ter nal pol icy.
It would be re ally use ful for Hun gary if the reg u la tory frame work in Ukraine
got better, as more than 80% of our nat u ral gas im ports are transited through
Ukraine. We are also look ing for ward to fur ther in te gra tion of the elec tric ity
mar ket and mar ket cou pling in the re gion. There is also a strong sup port for
 increasing the EU’s role in re lated in ter na tional or gani sa tions and in creas ing
the num ber of mem bers in the En ergy Char ter Treaty. This would be a short
 introduction to the topic from our per spec tive. Thank you!
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Petr Binhack2: In my con tri bu tion I will briefly touch the topic of the
Czech en ergy pol icy and the per spec tive on the Pol ish pres i dency of the EU
Coun cil. I’ll try to find some links be tween Czech ex pe ri ence and the Pol ish
pres i dency. What I’m go ing to do is an eval u a tion of the cur rent state of the EU 
ex ter nal en ergy pol icy. At this point I will dare to mod ify one old prov erb and
say that the EU en ergy pol icy is like a ghost. Ev ery body is talk ing about it but
no body re ally has seen it. Well, two years ago en ergy and cli mate change were
among the top pri or i ties of the Czech EU pres i dency. En ergy se cu rity, be sides
econ omy and Eu rope in the world, de fined our pres i dency agenda. How ever,
the Czech pres i dency was eval u ated with quite a bit of em bar rass ment, re sult -
ing mainly from in ter nal po lit i cal in sta bil ity and the fall of the gov ern ment.
But ex ter nal en ergy re la tions were con sid ered as a suc cess story. The Czech
pres i dency dealt with the gas cri sis in 2009 and ex ter nal re la tions emerged as
one of the key top ics. Be sides the gas cri sis, the Czech pres i dency dealt with
ex ter nal en ergy re la tions in the case of the Nabucco pipe line pro ject, which
was pushed for ward in May 2009 at the Prague con fer ence. Two years later
Po land will take over the EU pres i dency. It is the last heavy-weight pres i den -
tial coun try for the next two years. That is very true es pe cially in the case of en -
ergy se cu rity is sues. Given the his tor i cal, eco nomic, en ergy and geo graph ical
 circumstances Po land will face sim i lar chal lenges like the Czech pres i dency
did. En ergy de pend ency on gas and oil, im ports from Rus sia, ac tive ap proach
 towards nu clear en ergy, cli mate pol icy chal lenges and ob sta cles to in ter nal
mar ket reali sa tion. These are some of the con di tions un der which the EU
 Polish pres i dency will form its con tri bu tion to the EU en ergy pol icy and its
 future state. From my point of view it is very dif fi cult to com pare the Pol ish
and Czech pres i dency en ergy pri or i ties. As I said be fore, the Czech pres i dency 
had to deal with the gas cri sis in 2009 more than it had in tended and now I’ll
quote Mr. Bartuska, Czech Am bas sa dor-at-Large for En ergy Se cu rity, “If you
want to achieve some thing, a cri sis sit u a tion is the best op por tu nity”. That was
the case of the Czech pres i dency. To day more at ten tion is fo cused on the eco -
nomic cri sis, the euro zone debt cri ses and this is not over yet. So I don’t think
that the Pol ish pres i dency will have so much space in en ergy pol icy is sues as
the Czech pres i dency had. Dif fer ent top ics have emerged, and as we saw to -
day, the first panel was not about en ergy but about econ omy – that’s quite
self-ex plan a tory. There are also new se cu rity is sues that have emerged in last
few months. Rev o lu tions across North Af rica and the Mid dle East have some -
how over shad owed en ergy re la tions with Rus sia. The is sue of al ter na tive tran -
sit cor ri dors has lost its pop u lar ity and other is sues have be come more rel e vant
in the EU agenda. Ques tions of in ter nal mar ket and cli mate pol icy seem to be
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more im por tant than ever. These Cir cum stances will def i nitely shape both
 Polish pri or i ties and the re sults of the Pres i dency.
To briefly out line the Czech po si tion: From the en ergy se cu rity point of
view, Czech Re pub lic is in a good po si tion com pared to other post-So viet
coun tries in the re gion. We’re de pend ent on en ergy im ports from 28% which is 
be low the EU av er age. Pri mary en ergy mix is rel a tively di ver si fied with a high
pro por tion of do mes tic re sources, mainly brown coal with 43 per cent share on
pri mary en ergy mix. In elec tric ity pro duc tion we are highly de pend ent on coal
fired power plants, around 60% of our elec tric ity pro duc tion. Ap prox i mately
30% of our elec tric ity pro duc tion is from two nu clear power plants. There are
pro jects to build two more re ac tors in the next two de cades. So, we can say that
the sit u a tion in Czech Re pub lic is a bit dif fer ent from the sit u a tion in  Poland.
Other re sources like gas and re new able re sources are less im por tant in elec tric -
ity pro duc tion. How ever, we can ex pect a grow ing im por tance of gas fir ing
power plants and re new able re sources to achieve cli mate goals. In the 1990s
we suc cess fully di ver si fied our oil and gas im ports, which played a cru cial role 
dur ing the gas cri sis with re versed gas flows to Slovakia. From this per spec -
tive, dif fer ent con di tions in the en ergy sec tor could re sult in dif fer ent pri or i ties
as well. En ergy pri or i ties of the Czech Re pub lic are con cluded in the En ergy
strat egy con cept till 2050 ap proved in 2004 and up dated in 2010 to  respond to
les sons learned dur ing our Pres i dency of the EU Coun cil. The Czech En ergy
Strat egy is based upon the fol low ing pri or i ties: a bal anced  energy mix, en ergy
ef fi ciency, in ter nal mar ket within the EU and in ter na tional co op er a tion,
interconnectivity, sustainability, and of course se cu rity of sup plies. As you can 
see in these pri or i ties both in ter nal as ex ter nal en ergy is sues on the EU level
are re flected.
Now I would like to speak more in gen eral about the Eu ro pean Un ion. The
Eu ro pean Un ion is one of the big gest en ergy mar kets with a high rate of im port 
de pend ency. This de pend ency will rise in the com ing fu ture and it does not
mat ter if we talk about oil or gas. The Eu ro pean Un ion with out a sin gle en ergy
mar ket and sin gle ap proach to ward third coun tries won’t be able to re act to
 future chal lenges. Grow ing com pe ti tion from emerg ing econ o mies, mainly
from Asia, like China, In dia, etc., leads to a sit u a tion where the Eu ro pean Un -
ion is not able to achieve its ob jec tives as we can see in Sub-Sa ha ran Af rica or
the Cas pian re gion. Of course this is a prob lem not only in the case of en ergy,
but of the EU ex ter nal re la tions in gen eral. To day econ o mies of EU mem ber
states re quire safe, ef fi cient and sus tain able en ergy sup plies. This goal can be
reached only through a func tional in ter nal mar ket and ef fi cient re la tions with
key part ners. In terms of Czech pri or i ties at the EU level, the Czech Re pub lic
wants to play an im por tant role in de vel op ing the Trans-Eu ro pean Net work;
North-South, East-West in ter con nec tion in gas and elec tric ity with gas stor age 
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ca pa bil i ties as the key goal to achieve. We al ready con trib uted to the le gal
frame work of the in ter nal mar ket with the Third En ergy Pack age Agree ment
reached dur ing our pres i dency. The ques tion of suc cess ful im ple men ta tion of
2020 tar gets is re flected in the Czech Re pub lic, but the re sults are some thing of 
an em bar rass ment so far. 
The ex ter nal di men sion of the EU en ergy pol icy is some how a more pop u -
lar is sue in the Czech Re pub lic than a func tional in ter nal mar ket. This could be
a re sult of the last gas cri sis in 2009 when en ergy se cu rity dis course con cern -
ing the se cu rity of sup plies was highly po liti cised and this per sists in the Czech 
Re pub lic. As I could read in the in put study for this panel, the sit u a tion in
 Poland is very much the same. As a re sult, the Czech Re pub lic is one of the
stron gest sup port ers of a gas pipe line pro ject by pass ing Rus sia. I think that the
so-called South cor ri dor with the Nabucco pipe line as a flag ship is a good
 example. 
The next step for the EU en ergy pol icy is clear. We have to final ise the 
 internal mar ket, it means both le gal and in fra struc ture frame work. With out
com plet ing this task we can’t go fur ther with ex ter nal re la tions. At this point
I completely agree with Mr. Gromadzki. The ex ter nal di men sion can’t be
the “be all and for all” of the Pol ish pres i dency. But we can’t for get im por tant
pro jects for en ergy se cu rity pol icy, such as East ern Part ner ship Co op er a tion,
which has its en ergy di men sion and I think it is the Pol ish pres i dency which
has to push the pro ject for ward.
Severin Fischer3: I think that I’ll be the first speaker to day re fer ring to the
con se quences of the nu clear ca tas tro phe in March 2011, and this has a spe cial
rea son: Fukushima changed en ergy pol i cies no where in the world as fun da -
men tally as it did in Ger many and this also has had a ma jor im pact on the larg -
est elec tric ity mar ket in Eu rope and that is the Ger man one. Some of you might
re mem ber that in Sep tem ber 2010, the Ger man gov ern ment de cided on a new
en ergy con cept. Part of that was the life-time ex ten sion of nu clear power
plants. Some peo ple tend to for get that it was not only about nu clear power
plants. But that was of course one of its core el e ments. This plan has now been
changed and re versed at least tem po rarily but it does n’t mean that the other
parts of the strat egy are not valid any more and to some ex tent the change on the 
nu clear di men sion will also maybe en force other parts of this new strat egy. 
First I’ll point out a few cru cial parts of this Ger man strat egy that are still
valid and that will be de vel oped fur ther in the com ing months. Then I will talk
about the im pli ca tions from that for the EU en ergy pol icy and fi nally sug gest
some is sues for the Pol ish pres i dency. 
The Eu ro pean Un ion En ergy Pol icy in the programme... 43
3  Se ve rin Fi s cher is a Re se a r cher in the Ge r man In sti tu te for In ter na tio nal and
 Security Af fa irs in Be r lin.
Af ter Fukushima nu clear en ergy – and this is quite clear – will have no
 future in Ger many any more. This is due to so ci etal pres sure, but also due to
 already made de ci sions and the con sen sus reached un der the Schroeder
 government in the be gin ning of the cen tury to fade out nu clear power from the
en ergy mix. Nev er the less, peo ple tend to for get that the en ergy con cept I was
talk ing about be fore was not only about nu clear. There were also other im por -
tant pol icy tar gets and en vi ron men tal pro tec tion as pects in there. One is the
green house gas emis sion re duc tion of 40% by 2020 and 80-95% re duc tion by
2050. This is a fun da men tal change for the en ergy sys tem if it will be im ple -
mented in real pol icy terms. The other (also from my per spec tive very im por -
tant) tar gets are the re new able en ergy tar gets of 18% by 2020 and 60% by 2050 
– mean ing that at least 80% of elec tric ity will come from re new able sources in
2050. This means that en vi ron men tal pro tec tion and the idea of green growth
will re main the es sen tial el e ments of Ger man pol icy, maybe even more so af ter 
March 2011. The nu clear ca tas tro phe of Fukushima will have a few di rect and
short-term im pli ca tions for Ger many. The first one is the tem po rary shut-down 
of 7+1 nu clear power plants in Ger many that has been de cided in April. This
changes the in ter play on the elec tric ity mar kets fun da men tally. The sec ond
 decision re gards rather the long-term per spec tive. It is the in stal la tion of an
eth ics com mis sion that should dis cuss the con se quences of Fukushima for
Ger man en ergy pol icy and the fu ture of nu clear en ergy and a mor a to rium on
the ear lier de cided life-time ex ten sions of nu clear power plants. One of the
con se quences from this de bate, one that brings us di rectly to the Eu ro pean
 dimension, is that the mean ing of nat u ral gas will prob a bly in crease in
the coming years due to the gap that has to be filled in or der to run to a re new -
able age that we want to reach in 2050. But it has also very di rect con se quences 
in the very short term. What you see in Fig ure 1 is the net ex port-im port
 balance of the Ger man elec tric ity mar ket be fore and af ter the shut-down of the
7+1 nu clear power plants. In the last cou ple of years, Ger many was an ex porter 
of elec tric ity on av er age over each year. What has hap pened now is that we
will be on av er age at zero or slightly on a neg a tive ba sis. This also has im pli ca -
tions for the Eu ro pean elec tric ity mar ket due to the fact that the Ger man mar ket 
is so large and in geo graph ical terms in the cen tre of Eu rope. It also means that
the al ready high share of renewables and the vol a til ity of elec tric ity pro duc tion 
will be felt in the neigh bor ing mar kets more than be fore. The third con se -
quence, I think, of the de ci sion on nu clear power plants will be that the de vel -
op ment of re new able en er gies will get even more at ten tion than it had been
get ting be fore. What you can see in Fig ure 2 is that over a time pe riod of only
10 years, the share of renewables in the Ger man elec tric ity mix grow ing
from 7% to around 17% in the year 2010. 17% of the elec tric ity con sumed in
Ger many – just to give you a pic ture of the di men sions – is about the con sump -
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tion of the Czech Re pub lic and Slovakia to gether in a whole year. So the 17%
al ready mean a ma jor im pact for the Ger man elec tric ity mar ket. Now we’ll
have a re vi sion on the feed-in law for renewables in 2011 and of course the
Fukushima events will have an im pli ca tion on that. The first one is that we
need to go faster than be fore and we’re al ready quite fast on in creas ing the
share of renewables. On the other hand, it means that we have to or gan ise
a system in which renewables need to take up more re spon si bil ity on the mar -
ket. So far renewables are fed into the elec tric ity grid with out any con sid er -
ations about de mand struc tures or con se quences for net work sta bil ity. Now
they have to play more un der the mar ket rules in or der to bal ance the vol a til ity
as we saw in the last cou ple of weeks. It will also have con se quences on the
cost di men sion. Around 10 bln Eu ros are spent ev ery year by Ger man elec tric -
ity con sum ers on the feed-in law and the per spec tive for that is a steady
growth. It will have to be, af ter all, a two-fold strat egy: on one hand in creas ing
the share, on the other hand lim it ing costs and mak ing it more mar ket com pat i -
ble. And this brings me di rectly to the ques tion of EU en ergy pol icy in the
 German per spec tive and the im pli ca tions of the Ger man pol icy change on the
EU en ergy pol icy.  
So far I see the de bate is very much fo cused on how Ger many tries to cope
with the con se quences of its de ci sion and the chang ing shape of the Ger man
en ergy strat egy. But it will also lead to a re-ad just ment of the Ger man EU
 policy ap proach. The first di rect con se quence, I think, will be mas sive in vest -
ments that are needed in elec tric ity and gas. We’ve al ready kind of heard that
in the years be fore, but I think now the Ger man po si tion might also be a lit tle
bit chang ing. So far it was quite clear that only com pa nies should in vest in
 infrastructure, but I think the per spec tive on that is slightly chang ing with
 regard to the will ing ness of spend ing pub lic money on in fra struc ture. The
 debate about new in stru ments, a new level of fi nanc ing in fra struc tures, stor -
age, ca pac ity, things like that, is more likely to be more pos i tive in the com ing
months. The sec ond as pect that I think will come up within the next few years
is that Ger many must give up its re sis tance to the de vel op ment of co op er a tion
mea sures in the area of re new able en er gies. So far Ger many has pro tected its
feed-in sys tem very harshly. I think we will not be able to do that over a lon ger
term if you just com pare the de vel op ment of the Ger man re new able elec tric ity
mar ket with that of its neigh bor ing coun tries. So the idea would be to iden tify
added value in the sense of com mon pro jects, Eu ro pean pro jects in the re new -
able en ergy branch, for ex am ple in the North Sea or the Med i ter ra nean Sea,
that will be very im por tant as pects with re gard to us ing money more ef fi ciently 
and ef fec tively. The third as pect re lates to the fu ture of nat u ral gas in the
 energy mix and af ter the chang ing sit u a tion in the Ger man elec tric ity mar ket,
there could be also a Eu ro pean ap proach to wards de vel op ment in the gas
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 market. The first step is of course real im ple men ta tion of the in ter nal mar ket.
The sec ond one could be a more Eu ro pean ap proach to wards the ex ter nal
 energy pol icy. Fi nally, add ing the third con se quence, and I’m quite sure that
this topic will come up in the com ing weeks, namely the de bate about
 Europe-wide safety stan dards in nu clear power plants. This is for Ger many
a special topic if you look at the num bers of nu clear re ac tors. Just in a range of
120 km around the Ger man bor der there are 22 nu clear re ac tors. This means
that you can shut down the Ger man nu clear power plants but the safety will not 
be much in creased if you have in a cir cle around the Ger man bor der a sim i lar
prob lem. So that means Ger many will prob a bly work on new safety stan dards
for ex ist ing, but also for new in stal la tions. In the com ing years this will hope -
fully be fol lowed by a de bate about the fu ture of the Euratom Treaty.
Fi nally look ing a lit tle bit at the com par i son be tween the Ger man and the
Pol ish per spec tive on en ergy pol icy, which could be in ter est ing for the pres i -
dency, I just chose ran domly a cou ple of top ics which I think are quite im por -
tant in the dis cus sion. What we see from Fig ure 3 is that there are not many
com mon as pects in the sense that it will be hard to find any com mon grounds
for de bate. If you think about the nu clear power ques tion, of course, the Ger -
man po si tion seems to be quite clear on that. On the op po site, Po land has
a rather pos i tive or at least neu tral po si tion on that. Then spend ing money on
renewables on a large scale, I just said Ger many spent via its feed-in law about
10 bln. Eu ros a year. I think Po land will not be ready to spend the same amount
or a com pa ra ble amount on renewables. Then the hard coal ques tion also
 comes up and the po si tions are also quite dif fer ent on that. I al ready talked
about the en ergy in fra struc ture and the Ger man po si tion is quite clear that
there should be no Ger man money on the EU level to be spent on that. Po land
again is rather pos i tive, at least in the gas sec tor, on that. And the cru cial ques -
tion, I think, on the 20 or 30% emis sion re duc tion tar gets in the EU also shows
ma jor gaps be tween the two coun tries. In Ger many there is a split be tween the
En vi ron men tal Min is try and the Min is try for Econ omy but I think the Pol ish
po si tion is quite clear that there will be no change to the emis sion re duc tion tar -
get in the EU in the com ing years. In the ex ter nal pol icy, I think the Ger man
po si tion is and still will be that com pa nies are the ma jor ac tors in that branch
and I think Po land and other Cen tral and East Eu ro pean Coun tries have
a slightly dif fer ent per spec tive on that. 
So, what could the Pol ish pres i dency do, also maybe from a Ger man per -
spec tive? I think the first and the most im por tant as pect is the as pect of build -
ing bridges. I think es pe cially in Pol ish en ergy pol icy we see some thing like an 
East-West di vi sion and this is most ob vi ous in the area of spend ing EU money. 
If there would be a cred i ble con cept – and the Com mis sion is work ing on that,
es pe cially in in fra struc ture – look ing at the En ergy Ef fi ciency Ac tion Plan
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could also bring a ben e fit. There are a cou ple of mea sures that could de liver
a com mon added value to all 27-mem ber states in the EU, so I think the topic
how to con nect the bud get de ci sion with the en ergy pol icy de ci sion and also
the de vel op ment of a re source ef fi cient econ omy could be one of the top ics the
Pol ish pres i dency could work on. Then I think that a more long-term dis cus -
sion that might be not so con crete but also very im por tant is the need for a more 
in-depth de bate about the role of the Eu ro pean ex ter nal en ergy pol icy.
As I said be fore, the per cep tion of an ex ter nal en ergy pol icy in Eu rope is
quite dif fer ent be tween Mem ber States. There fore, an open de bate about that
is one of the im por tant things. The co op er a tion and har mo ni sa tion of re new -
able  support re port schemes could be a topic to talk about in the com ing
months and the Pol ish pres i dency would be maybe a good ac tor in or der to
start the dis cus sion. And fi nally the Com mis sion an nounced that they’ll
 deliver an En ergy Roadmap for 2050, so this is also a topic where the Pol ish
pres i dency could  really bring an in put to start a long-term dis cus sion with the 
part ners in the EU.
I think the sec ond half of 2011 un der the Pol ish pres i dency will not be the
time of big de ci sions. But this of fers the chance to start an open dis cus sion
about the gen eral stra te gic aims, maybe fol low up on the dis cus sions we
missed in Feb ru ary dur ing the En ergy Sum mit. This could in clude a few top ics
that were not openly dis cussed over the last cou ple of years but could be
 decisive in the long run. 
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